The evidence and mechanisms employed in intuitive hypothesis testing. by Blyth, Daniel Patrick
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-1981
The evidence and mechanisms employed in
intuitive hypothesis testing.
Daniel Patrick Blyth
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Blyth, Daniel Patrick, "The evidence and mechanisms employed in intuitive hypothesis testing." (1981). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 -
February 2014. 1386.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/1386

THE EVIDENCE AND MECHANISMS EMPLOYED IN
INTUITIVE HYPOTHESIS TESTING
A Dissertation Presented
By
DANIEL PATRICK BLYTH
Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
February 1981
Psychology
THE EVIDENCE AND MECHANISMS EMPLOYED IN
INTUITIVE HYPOTHESIS TESTING
A Dissertation Presented
By
Daniel Patrick Blyth
Approved as to style and content by:
hi M,
leek Ajzen, C/hairperson of Committee
Jerome Myers, Member^
Ronnie Jano^f-B^ Lman, Member
W. Barnett Pearce, Member
^JSharles Clifton, Department Head
Psychology
Acknowledgements
This work grew out of my interest in understanding how people come
to their inferences about others. Icek Ajzen promoted that interest
and helped me in learning how to conceptualize and test my ideas.
Jerry Myers was, throughout this project, very generous with
his time, knowledge, and patience. After each of my meetings with him,
I felt more enthusiastic about my work and more confident of my
ability to carry it out.
This dissertation is the culmination of my graduate career, a
career that has been enriched by my association with Linda Lang-Gunn.
She shared her journals and knowledge, and freely gave her friendship
and support.
Finally, and most especially, I thank Lynn. I'll remember this
dissertation as a long and arduous project that often left me confused,
bored, dispirited, angry, and generally a pain in the ass to be with.
Lynn graciously endured all this and, even more, provided the love,
stability, and encouragement that enabled me to rise above it.
Both as a personal life event and as an academic achievement,
the importance of this dissertation will diminish in the years to come.
I hope, though, that I remember that it represented my honest effort to
do the best I could. I'm proud of what I've accomplished.
ii
ABSTRACT
The Evidence and Mechanisms Employed In
Intuitive Hypothesis Testing
(February, 1981)
Daniel Patrick Blyth, B.A., University of Colorado
M.A.
,
University of Massachusetts, Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor leek Ajzen
This paper examines and critiques experimental approaches to the
study of intuitive reasoning. The insufficiency of earlier attempts to
characterize human judgment via mathematical or probabilistic models was
traced to three sources: the inability of the probability calculus to
adequately typify causal relationships, the presumption of analytic cue
integration to the exclusion of other (e.g., analogic) processing, and
the failure of mathematical formulations to incorporate the rich store
of archival information an individual brings to any judgment.
The more recent attempts to describe intuitive reasoning in terms
of cognitive heuristics were also examined. While this approach holds
forth the promise of a more adequate description of the processes
actually used by individuals, its assumption of discrete and task-
specific judgmental strategies will obscure and delay the exploration of
the fundamental principles guiding the way in which information is used
enroute to any decision or inference.
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Both the probabilistic and the heuristic models of judgment he
identified several errors in intuitive reasoning. One of these is the
"confirmatory error"— the tendency to use predominately confirming
evidence in evaluating the plausibility of a hypothesis. An experi-
mental study was conducted to better determine the source of this error.
Is it due to memory or interpretive errors? Does the hypothesis enhance
the retrievability of confirming evidence while masking or suppressing
the recall of disconf irming data? Or is the interpretation of retrieved
evidence altered such that more data comes to be viewed as supportive of
the hypothesis? The obtained results suggest that both the retrieval and
the interpretation of evidence is affected by the hypothesis, and these
effects are to some extent dependent upon the instructions or orientation
brought to the judgmental context. If individuals are asked to review
the information they consider relevant, there is a tendency to focus
more on confirming than disconf irming evidence. It is suggested that
this tendency arises because the instructions encourage the use of a
comparison-to-prototype decision strategy, and the prototype is weighted
in favor of the hypothesis. Under more critical instructions when the
decision maker is prompted to first review all available evidence about
the issue, and then to evaluate each bit of that evidence for its
implications for the hypothesis, the confirmatory error is less likely
to occur. The findings also suggest that under either orientation there
is a tendency to interpret ambiguous or ambivalent evidence as supportive.
iv
The paper concludes with the challenge to investigators of social
cognition to resolve an apparent paradox: The experimental literature
has shown intuitive reasoning processes to be seriously and pervasively
flawed, yet the impression of reality is that individuals, and the
species, reason appropriately— they generally manage their daily affairs
well, avoiding harm to themselves and others, they learn from their
mistakes, and they adapt their decisions accordingly in light of past
experience. One of the two impressions is misleading. Either the
optimistic view of reality is yet another example of cognitive errors
or the pessimistic impression created by the literature is overstated.
v
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CHAPTER I
PREDICTIVE MODELS OF JUDGMENT
Social judgment, in its broadest sense, is concerned with the way
in which people develop beliefs, make inferences, generate predictions,
and evaluate conclusions about other people or events. Defined this
globally, the field has a long history of research and includes such
diverse areas as attribution theory, models of decision-making, and
interpersonal judgment. Although wide-ranging in terms of the
particular judgments and contexts examined, these different content
domains share a common objective, the accurate description of
intuitive reasoning.
An obvious difficulty is that researchers cannot observe the
reasoning process per se. The way in which a decision is made can
only be inferred from the decision itself. Under this constraint
much of the initial research on social judgment adopted the procedure
of comparing informal or intuitive judgments against those which
would be prescribed by normative or statistical models of information
usage. Normative models, based on statistical and probability
theory, are an attractive standard of comparison because they
represent "rational" inferential strategies, rational in the sense
that the informational parameters obey certain rules, and the entire
process is information-bound. Judgments are based solely upon avail-
able information and they are therefore unaffected by "irrational"
factors such as the arbitrary prejudices or desires of the particular
judge making the decision. In addition to their freedom from
1
2motivational biases, rational decisions are similarly unencumbered
by cognitive failings. They are not, for example, victimized by
inefficient organization in memory nor by memory losses.
A great many comparison-to-normative studies have been conducted,
but the obtained results are conflicting. Peterson and Beach (1967)
reviewed over one hundred such studies and concluded that "normative
models provide a good first approximation for a psychological theory
of inference. Inferences made by subjects are influenced by
appropriate variables in appropriate directions" (pp. 42-43). Slovic
and Lichtenstein (1971) conducted a similar review and came to a
similar conclusion. Linear statistical models were found to account
for most of the variance in subjective inferences. Not all
researchers, however, share these conclusions. Simon (1957) decided
that people have a limited capacity for rational (i.e., normative)
thinking and operate instead on a principle of "bounded rationality."
This bounded rationality "is not even approximately optimal" (p. 198).
Slovic (1972) reviewed more than twenty-five studies of subjective
decision-making and concluded that intuitive processes "show large
and consistent biases" (p. 41). Slovic, Fischoff, and Lichenstein
(1976) found that people "systematically violate the principles of
rational decision-making when judging probabilities, making
predictions, or otherwise attempting to cope with probabilistic
tasks" (p. 169). Hammond (1974) examined decisions made about social
policy and came to the pessimistic conclusion that "man's cognitive
capacities are not adequate for the tasks which confront him" (p. 4).
3Irrational Reasoning or Unequivalent Information
These different conclusions create the impression that sometimes
people reason rationally and sometimes they don't. This need not
suggest, however, that intuitive judgmental strategies are
capriciously invoked, that people choose to obey statistical rules
when they feel like it and avoid them when, for arbitrary reasons,
they do not. Comparison-to-normative studies do not illuminate what
people actually do with information. For the most part, they can
only show whether or not the intuitive scientist has reached the
normative solution. When discrepancies between intuitive and
statistical judgments occur, the researcher cannot know, in most cases,
whether the discrepancy arose because the individual used different
information enroute to the decision or because he or she employed an
inappropriate decision rule. Unfortunately, this distinction has
often been overlooked. For the most part, such discrepancies have
been cited as evidence of irrational processes when the alternative
explanation is more likely. Another look at the literature suggests
that as statistical models include more of the information subjects
perceive to be relevant to their decisions, they more accurately
predict subjective judgments.
Consider, first of all, the studies which show an agreement
between statistical and intuitive judgments. In the main, this
concordance in judgment has been found when the stimuli involved have
been non-social (e.g., bundles of sticks, poker chips, flashing
lights, etc.). On the other hand, disagreements between the
common
"statistical man" and the "intuitive scientist" tend to be more
and most pronounced when the stimulus materials portray events with
which the subject already has some familiarity (e.g., people's
personalities, naturally occurring event sequences, and so on). When
the statistical man and the intuitive scientist begin with the same
prior information—that is no prior information— their decisions are
in greater agreement. However, when the intuitive judge brings to
the experimental session some assumptions and beliefs about the class
of events portrayed in the stimulus materials, and when those
assumptions are not shared by the statistical man, their judgments
diverge.
In the typical procedure in normative studies of judgment the
experimenter constructs stimulus materials to vary certain parameters.
This manipulation allows the researcher to calculate the statistically
optimal use of the information provided. From the experimenter's
point of view, the final decision is a function of the information
he or she provides to the subjects. However, the subjects themselves
are not similarly constrained solely to whatever information is made
available during the experiment. The "illusory correlation" studies
provide a good example. Chapman and Chapman (1967) paired Rorschach
percepts (responses) with two statements of the clinical symptoms of
the purported patient who was alleged to have made the response.
Subjects were shown thirty such pairs, each representing a different
patient. After viewing all thirty pairs, subjects were given a
symptom and asked to recall the most prevalent Rorschach percept by
5patients with that symptom. The normatively correct procedure for
estimation of covariance consists of computing a correlation
coefficient based on equal attention to both diagonals in the 2 x 2
contingency matrix. In this experiment (Experiment 2), the stimulus
materials were prepared in such a way that no correlation actually
existed between percepts and symptoms. While the relationship was not
actually present in the experimental materials, it was consistent with
people's typical assumptions (as measured with pretest subjects) about
the correlation between certain symptoms and particular traits.
Subjects' estimates of the correlation in the stimulus materials were
thus strongly affected by their previous beliefs about what they
believed to be true in the general population, regardless of what was
said to be true during this one experimental session. Berman and
Kenny (1976) reported very similar findings. Inferences about the
personality characteristics of a fictitious person were found to be
substantially influenced by the assumed covariances of those
characteristics in people at large, independent of their correlation
in a sample of stimulus materials. This reliance on prior beliefs
rather than only upon the empirical relationships displayed in
contrived experimental information has been replicated in a variety of
contexts (cf. Ajzen, 1977; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978; Jenkins & Ward,
1965; Snyder & Uranowitz, 1978; Smedslund, 1963; Ward & Jenkins, 1965;
Wason, 1960, 1968, 1969).
In numerous other examples, biases or errors were attributed to
subjects when the experimental results do not necessarily support
bthat view. In a recent series of investigations, Ross and his
colleagues have examined the persistence of intuitive beliefs. Of
particular interest was the continued reliance on those beliefs when
the evidence presented argued against their validity. Although a
variety of experimental settings, tasks, and methods for discrediting
evidence have been employed, the basic procedure in all these studies
has been fairly consistent.
Subjects receive false feedback after each trial in a novel dis-
crimination, judgment, or performance task. After this manipulation
of subjects' impressions of their abilities, the experimenter
"discredits" the evidence upon which the impression was based. Dis-
crediting consists of a debriefing session in which the subject
learns that the feedback was totally arbitrary and unrelated to his
or her actual performance. Other discrediting procedures have
included providing subjects with an alternative explanation of their
performance. For example, in a "logical problem solving task"
discrediting was accomplished by informing subjects that good or poor
teaching methods, rather than their own abilities , were the cause of
their success or failure (Lau, Lepper, & Ross, 1976). Following this
discrediting session in which they acknowledge their understanding
of the experimental deception, subjects are asked to predict their
performance on similar tasks in the future. The consistent finding
is that the false feedback "perseveres" and continues to strongly
influence subjects' predictions despite its extensive and acknowledged
discrediting
.
7These results, that predictions about performance in the future
are consistent with knowledge about prior performance, can be
explained without assuming an unwarranted reliance on invalidated
beliefs. Since subjects' use of a priori understandings was not
directly assessed, it is not certain that such understandings were
actually invoked. It is possible that subjects (or at least some of
them) had no idea of the reasons for their success or failure in these
novel tasks. In estimating their performance on subsequent tasks,
they may have adopted the reasonable strategy which prescribes that
the best predictor of future ability is past ability. Although the
evidence about their ability was questioned, it could, especially in
the absence of any other predictive base, continue to serve as the
best estimate of their subsequent performance.
In more recent work, Ross and his associates have extended this
research to examine more directly the survival of intuitive beliefs
or theories themselves. In one experiment, theories were provided
for subjects (Anderson & Ross, 1978). At the beginning of the
experimental session subjects were led to believe that a relationship
existed between a personality characteristic (riskiness) and
performance (success or failure as a fireman) . After informing
subjects of the "theory," concrete examples ostensibly confirming the
theory were presented. As in the previous studies, subjects were
then debriefed, i.e., they were told that the experimenter had made
up both the theory and the examples. Following this debriefing
session, subjects were asked to predict personality traits (riskiness)
8on the basis of performance information—a test of their continued
reliance on discredited theories. The results indicated that subjects
continued to believe that the initially presented theory characterized
the true functional relationship. Their predictions were in accordance
with the fictitious theory.
In another experiment reported by Anderson and Ross (1978), sub-
jects were not provided with an a priori theory, but were instead
given information about the personalities and performances of two
persons and were asked to discover the relationship between traits and
performance. After the functional relationship had been discovered,
the debriefing procedures were employed. Again, the theories
survived the debriefing sessions and were used as the basis for sub-
sequent predictions.
These results are said to demonstrate that once a theory is
accepted as a plausible explanation for the observed relationship
between antecedents and consequents, it survives the erosion or dis-
crediting of its evidential base. Whether the theory was provided by
the experimenter or induced by subjects themselves, it continued to
influence their predictions even after the theory and its supporting
data were acknowledged to have been fabricated by the researcher.
However, this finding reflects an unwarranted use of disconfirmed
theories only if the theories have no other support than that provided,
and discredited, during the experiment.
9Consider, for example, a subject who is told that he or she has
been successful in discriminating between genuine and bogus suicide
notes (Ross, Lepper, & Hubbard, 1975). Since no "theory" explaining
the causes of such successful discrimination was provided, the subject
is free to call upon his or her own beliefs. To explain this apparent
success the subject can invoke a generalized theory of performance in
any task, reasoning, perhaps, that success arises from a combination
of sufficient innate ability and practice. The subject then searches
for evidence attesting to his or her possession of these causal
properties. (One subject attributed his success to his prior reading
of the works of a suicidal author—evidence, perhaps, of practice.)
This theory explaining success stands as a generalized rule. It has
accounted for success or failure in countless previous tasks. There
is no reason to suppose, and indeed it would be irrational if, this
validated theory were abandoned in the face of the single experimental
instance in which it may or may not have been confirmed. In this study,
the evidence was questioned, but it was not denied. Despite the fact
that after debriefing the subject is unsure of his or her actual
performance, the theory relating ability and/or practice to performance
is still valid, as is the historical evidence for his or her possession
of the causal factors indicated by the theory.
In the second series of experiments by Ross and Anderson, the
experimenter provided the theory. For some subjects, riskiness was
said to be positively related to a fireman's performance. For others,
the converse was said to be true. In either case, the subjects found
10
riskiness to be a plausible cause of either success or failure.
Anderson and Ross report that subjects in both conditions were able to
explain why riskiness was related to competence in a fireman.
Riskiness is a plausible cause of competence because examples of in-
stances in which its presence or absence co-varied with success or
failure are available in memory. Both theories are thus supportable
by historical evidence. Even though the experimenter said he con-
cocted it himself, subjects were able to support the theory with
remembered instances. They could therefore continue to use the theory
as a predictor. It is easy to imagine that quite different findings
would have been obtained if the theory provided by the experimenter
were implausible, i.e., if it were not supportable by evidence
obtained outside the experimental session. If, for instance, the
theory had suggested a functional relationship between hair color and
fire-fighting ability, the perseverance effect would probably not
occur. Such a theory would be quickly abandoned after debriefing.
Ross et al suggest that their research demonstrates "the
survival of theories in the absence of evidence" (Anderson & Ross, 1978).
That is true only if evidence is limited to that presented in
experimental sessions. As in many of the studies cited previously,
it denies the evidence subjects bring with them to the experiment.
Studies of this kind make it clear that individual shave and use
a rich store of historical knowledge to guide their inferences and
decisions. They do not base their judgments solely on whatever
information is currently available, but freely and confidently draw
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upon their stored understandings of similar people and events. As long
as statistical models do not take into account historical knowledge,
discrepancies between intuitive and normative judgments are to be
expected. A principal source of such discrepancies can thus be
traced to differences in information and not to fallacious or irrational
reasoning on the part of the intuitive decision-maker. Peterson and
Beach (1967) recognized this point after their review: "If the
statistical man were to incorporate subjects' assumptions, his
inferences would be more descriptive of those made by subjects" (p. 43).
Prior beliefs and assumptions can be included in statistical
decision-making. Bayesian models, for example, specify the way in
which new information should be reconciled with existing or prior
information. The latter is represented in Bayes ' theorem as the
prior probability or expected value. A large number of studies have
shown that the inclusion of prior information decreases the dis-
crepancy between normative and subjective judgments. Although in-
dividuals often tend to be conservative in their probability revisions,
Bayes' theorem has been shown to be a reasonably good predictive
model of many judgments, including trait inferences (Peterson,
Ulehla, Miller, Bourne, & Stilson, 1965), impression formation
(Cohen, 1973), interpersonal relations (McNeel & Messick, 1970), and
attribution processes (Ajzen, 1971).
However, Kahneman and Tversky (1972, 1973) have found that people
do not judge in a manner consistent with normative principles even
when prior odds are included in the normative model. On the basis
of a series of experiments they concluded that people "do not appear
L2
to follow the calculus of chance or the statistical theory of
prediction" (1973, p. 237) and that "man is not a conservative
Bayesian; he is not a Bayesian at all" (1972, p. 450).
In one experiment, subjects were given brief descriptions of five
people. One description, for example, described Jack as a 45 year
old man with a wife and four children. Jack was said to be con-
servative, careful, ambitious, with no interest in politics or social
affairs, and was said to spend his free time on carpentry, sailing,
and mathematical puzzles. Prior odds were manipulated by varying
the sample size from which the descriptions were drawn. Subjects in
one condition were told that the sketch was randomly chosen from
summaries prepared by a panel of psychologists who interviewed 30
engineers and 70 lawyers. Subjects in the other base rate condition
read that the psychologists had interviewed 70 engineers and 30
lawyers. After presentation of this information, subjects were asked
to judge whether Jack was an engineer or a lawyer. Kahneman and
Tversky found that subjects in both conditions decided that Jack was
more likely to be an engineer. The Bayesian procedure prescribes
that the decision should be a function of two factors: the prior odds,
i.e., the prior probability that any person in the sample is a lawyer
or an engineer, and the probability that the description provided
fits a lawyer or an engineer. In this case, the prior odds were
given by the sample sizes. In the high-engineer condition, the prior
probability was 70/30. Conversely, in the low-engineer (or high-
lawyer) condition, the prior odds were 30/70. Given the marked
difference in prior probabilities, subjects in the high-engineer
13
group should predict that Jack is more likely to be an engineer,
while the other subjects should be similarly influenced by their
prior odds and judge that Jack is a lawyer.
In another demonstration, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) told their
subjects about a certain town having both a large and a small
hospital. Forty-five babies are born each day in the larger hospital
and fifteen in the smaller. When asked which hospital recorded more
days on which more than 60% of the babies born were male, most
subjects confidently answered that there was no difference, that
each hospital would have recorded an equal number of such days.
According to sampling theory, the smaller hopsital should have been
chosen. Because the number of births is less in the smaller
hospital, the variance in the ratio of boys and girls will, most
likely, be higher. The chances are therefore greater that the smaller
hospital recorded more days during which the number of boys was
significantly greater than the number of girls. The subjects in
this experiment, however, did not let this consideration influence
their predictions.
Judgments by subjects in both of these problems reflect a
lack of attention to base rates. In the engineer example, the
optimally correct judgment is determined, in part, by the respective
sample sizes. Similarly, in the second example, the choice of
hospitals is, normatively, dependent upon the sample size. Results
of these and similar studies (Bar-Hillel, 1975; Hammerton, 1973;
Lyon & Slovic, 1976; Nisbett & Borgida, 1975; Nisbett, Borgida,
Crandall, & Reed, 1976) have been interpreted as evidencing a bias
14
in intuitive reasoning, a bias in that relevant information about
the statistical parameter is not weighted by the size of the sample
from which the parameter was derived.
However, it is not the case that people simply do not attend
to sample sizes or base rates. Tversky and Kahneman (1973) did find
that the effect of the manipulation of base rates was significant in
their study; it was, however, overshadowed by the specific information
about Jack. They also found that when no other information about the
person is provided, prior probabilities guide subjects' judgments.
Also, Bar-Hillel (1975) found that inferences and predictions are
appropriately influenced by base rates when those base rates are
extreme. Some recent research on this issue has helped explain why
prior probabilities and base rates are relatively ignored in some
cases and appropriately relied upon in others.
Ajzen (1977) asked his subjects to assess the likelihood that an
hypothetical student had passed a final exam. A brief description of
the student was provided, as was base rate information. Two
different forms of the base rate information were used. Some sub-
jects were told that the hypothetical student was a member of a class
in which 75% of the students passed (or, in another condition, failed)
the exam. Subjects in the other base rate group read that a
psychologist chose to interview a sample of which 75% had passed (or
failed), and that the hypothetical student was a member of the chosen
sample. Clearly, the base rates in the first condition imply something
about the difficulty of the exam, a factor causally relevant in an
estimate of the likelihood of any student's success on the exam. The
second base rates carry no such causal implications; they merely
summarize the interviewing preferences of the psychologist. Ajzen's
data indicated that subjects in both conditions took into account
the base rates provided, but causal base rates much more strongly
influenced subjects' predictions. Note that the Bayesian solution to
this problem would be the same in both base rate conditions
— the
numerical values of these prior probabilities are identical.
However, it is their connotative implications, and, more accurately,
their causal implications that render them more or less relevant to
the judgment. If base rates provide causally relevant information,
they appropriately influence inferences. If, on the other hand,
they merely summarize the frequency distribution of non-causal
variables, they are given little or no weight in subjective decision-
making. Base rates in the form of distributional frequencies impart
no causal information. They serve only to express highly generalized
expectancies about any member of the sample selected at random. In
these experimental examples, and indeed in most inferential tasks,
people are required to make predictions about particular individuals
or events, not about any person or event of a certain kind taken at
random.
If subjects in Tversky and Kahneman's studies had been asked the
same question about people's occupations or about other pairs of
hospitals, and if they continued ignoring base frequencies and
sample sizes, they would, in the long run, err more often than they
were correct. However, it may not be fair to condemn subjective
16
reasoning as fallacious simply because it would render erroneous
results in the long run. It may be better to evaluate subjective
decisions on logical grounds rather than on purely statistical
grounds. Subjects in Tversky and Kahneman's studies followed a
logically reasonable course; they invoked their intuitive beliefs to
assess whether any of Jack's or the hospitals' characteristics were
of the kind known to them to cause (or co-vary with) the suggested
outcomes
.
^
Modelling Causal Reasoning
The studies conducted by Ajzen show that not all information is
equally relevant in subjective judgments. Although sample sizes
may be critically important to the statistical man, they are usually
less important to the intuitive scientist. Ajzen 's results point to
the predominant role of causality in human reasoning. People think in
causal terms, and this has been unambiguously documented in varied
contexts. Michotte (1963) has shown that individuals tend to perceive
causality merely from the observation of temporarily contiguous
events. Piagetian theory (Piaget, 1972; Piaget & Inhelder, 1969) holds
that understandings about causality are an inherent part of and con-
comitant with the process of cognitive development. Numerous learning
studies have documented that people rarely see events as randomly
determined (cf. Peterson & Beach, 1967; Smedslund, 1963; Ward &
Jenkins, 1965). Because events in their day-to-day lives are the
product of identifiable causes, people do not regard chance as a
17
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suitable explanation for events in experimental settings. Subjects
believe that patterns are present in experimental materials and that
the underlying regularities can be discovered, often despite the
researchers instructions to the contrary. (In many cases, the sub-
jects are correct. Jones and Myers (1966) have shown that sequence
experimentally randomized in short block are often not truly randc
at all and that subjects can outguess the experimenter. See
Myers, 1966, for a review.) Heider (1958, Kelley (1967, 1973), and
other attribution theorists (cf. Jones & Davis, 1965) have demonstrated
the prevalance and impact of causal reasoning in person perception
(see Janoff-Bulman's review, 1977). Ajzen's (1977) data and results
of similar studies by Tversky and Kahneman (in press) show that people
look for and prefer causal antecedents even when they are, from a
statistical point of view, no more diagnostic than other information.
In addition to the tendency to prefer causal evidence upon which to
base a prediction about the future, people prefer causal explanations
for events that have already occurred, even when other reasons (e.g.,
sampling variability, regression to the mean) are available as
sufficient alternative explanations.
Normative statistical models, however, cannot accomodate this
fundamental feature of human reasoning, largely because they do not
define the temporal ordering of events. In a recent paper, Tversky
and Kahneman (in press) describe a set of experiments originally
conducted by Turoff (1972). Subjects were asked to estimate the likeli-
hood of one event in light of another event. The information provided to
subjects in one study was the following (as summarized by Tversky
18
and Kahneman)
:
Let C be the event that within the next five years
Congress will have passed a law to curb mercury pollution.
Let D be the event that within the next five years the
number of deaths attributed to mercury poisoning will
exceed 500. Let C and D indicate the negations of C and D,
respectively.
After presentation of this information, subjects were asked to estimate
which member of two pairs of conditional probabilities was most likely:
1. p (C/D) or p (C/D)
and
2. p (D/C) or p (D/C)
Most subjects estimated that Congress is more likely to restrict mercury
pollution if the death toll rises than if it does not. The majority
of subjects also judged that the death toll is less likely to rise if
the law is enacted than if it is not. That is, subjects estimated:
1. p (C/D) > p (C/D)
and
2. p (D/C) < p (D/C)
While these are intuitively reasonable judgments, they violate the
normative statistical conventions.
Event sequences can be linked statistically only through condition-
al probability statements. The normative judgment in this problem,
given by the rules of conditional probability, is that
if p (C/D) > p (C/D) (as subjects in this experiment estimated)
then p (D/C) < p (D/C)
19
This discrepancy between intuitive and statistically optimal
judgments arises because conditional probabilities are temporarily
ambivalent; neither event is assumed to precede or cause the other.
Subjective decisions, however, routinely make assumptions about the
temporal order and causal relationships between events. The differ-
ence between normative and informal estimates in judgments of this
kind does not reflect irrationality or even bounded rationality on
the part of subjects. The subjective decision can be shown to
obey logical and probabilistic rules if the probability calculus is
expanded to include the temporal order of events. Suppes (1970) has
suggested one way to describe causal relationships in probabilistic
terms. His work does not constitute a full probabilistic theory
of causality, and given the prevalence of causal reasoning in human
judgment, much more work is needed. Nevertheless, even the formative
bases of such a theory provide a better description of intuitive
causal reasoning than that afforded by conditional probability state-
ments.
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If the first two statements are assumed to be true, as they apparently
were, and reasonably so, by subjects in Turoff's study, they imply
p (D/C) < p (D/C)
which is the judgment Turoff's subjects rendered. Although contrary
to the rules of conditional probability, it is logically correct. The
fallacy here does not rest with subjects' reasoning, but with the
attempt to model that reasoning via an inappropriate statistical
formula.
CHAPTER II
DESCRIPTIVE MODELS OF JUDGMENT
The inability of the probability calculus to accomodate causal
principles, given that causality plays such a central role in human
reasoning, represents a serious limitation of the adequacy of statis-
tical models of the inference process. Furthermore, even when statis-
tical models are shown to be predictive of intuitive judgments, there
is no suggestion that statistical reasoning bears any resemblance to the
actual processes people employ in their decisions. Recent research on
social judgment has turned away from statistical models as analogues
and has aimed toward a more descriptively accurate explanation of
intuitive reasoning. Most current research has acknowledged the
importance of previously stored information— the knowledge that
individuals have accumulated over time—and recognizes that they do
not, neither in their daily lives nor in experimental tasks, judge
each new instance as if it were wholly independent from any other
previous experience. People bring with them remembered examples of
similar instances and evaluate new occurrences in light of previous
ones. Any descriptive theory of judgment should provide an explanation
of how people invoke their stored knowledge enroute to inferences
about the particular people or events at hand. This explanation would
necessarily include assumptions about the way in which information
about prior instances is represented in memory, and about how that
information is accessed and used.
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Cognitive Heuristics
In the series of articles cited above, Kahneman and Tversky
(1972, 1973: Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) proposed that people have
developed a limited number of judgmental "heuristics". These
heuristics are described in terms of cognitive rules-of-thumb, short-
cut methods of using stored beliefs to infer or predict something
about new people or events. According to Kahneman and Tversky,
people use different heuristics in different judgmental tasks.
The "representativeness" heuristic, for example, is said to be
used in determining whether or not a particular instance is an
example or a member of a superordinate category. In judgments of this
kind, people consider the extent to which the essential features of
the new instance are representative of or similar to the defining
characteristics of the category. To return to the lawyer/engineer
example, Kahneman and Tversky (1973) suggest that subjects inferred
Jack's occupation by comparing his attributes to those of the most
typical or most representative lawyers and engineers. Because
Jack's traits and preferences were more like those of the stereo-
typical engineer, subjects assigned him to that category.
The "availability" heuristic is said to guide judgments of
frequency or probability. Judgments of the likelihood of occurrence
are based on the ease with which similar occurrences can be recalled
from memory. In one demonstration of this heuristic, subj ects
were asked whether the letter K appeared more often in the
first or
third position of English words. Because words beginning
with K are
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more easily retrieved from memory than words which have a K as the
third letter, subjects guessed, erroneously, that K is more likely
to appear in the first position (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973).
The "anchoring and adjustment" heuristic is said to be employed
in judgments of numerical values when some initial value is made
available and salient. For example, subjects in one experiment were
initially given a randomly generated number. They were then asked
to indicate whether the random number was higher or lower than the
number of African nations in the United Nations. Finally, subjects
were asked to estimate the actual number of African members in the
United Nations. Despite the fact that the initial value was known to
be arbitrarily drawn, it markedly affected subjects' final estimates.
When the random number was high, subjective estimates of African
members were high. When the initial value was low, subjects'
guesses were correspondingly lower. It appeared that subjects
followed a strategy of adjusting their estimates from the initial
anchoring value, even though that anchor was clearly irrelevant to the
question (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974)
.
Tversky and Kahneman' s work on heuristics is an important step in
the development of a theory of intuitive reasoning. However, there are
some troublesome aspects of a conceptual framework which posits dis-
crete and disconnected judgmental strategies. Particularly problematic
is the assumption of task-specific judgmental processes. This implies
that there may be as many discrete heuristics as there are types of
decisions, with the attendant implication that a theory of subjective
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judgment would consist of little more than a catalogue of qualitatively
distinct tasks, each with its matching heuristic. Secondly, even
within a single type of task, different heuristics can compete as
explanations of the processes employed. For example, perhaps subjects
judged Jack to be an engineer, via the representativeness heuristic,
by assessing the similarities between his characteristics and those of
the stereotypical engineer. But couldn't the same judgment be ex-
plained in terms of the availability heuristic by assuming that
examples of engineers who possessed characteristics like Jack's were
more available in memory than examples of lawyers who possess Jack's
traits?
The Theory of Lay Epistemology
Kruglanski and his colleagues have offered an alternative frame-
work by which to analyze and understand intuitive reasoning. The
theory of lay epistemology (Kruglanski, Hamel, Maides, & Schwartz,
1978; Kruglanski & Ajzen, Note 1) views the process as a sequential
series of steps by which an individual uses both historical knowledge
and current information to generate inferences and make judgments
about a particular person, entity or event. This theory assumes that
there exists a single fundamental judgmental process, one that is
relatively invariant across different tasks and that is stable
regardless of the kind of knowledge relevant to the question at hand.
Individuals are likened to scientists in their pursuit of answers to
their questions. According to the theory, the course of the "epistemic
episode" leading to any inference or judgment involves the following
stages
.
I. Problem Initiation
In everyday affairs, questions requiring a decision or judg-
ment emerge from or are initiated by the individual's experiences. In
psychological experiments, the problems are posed by the researcher.
II. Problem Formulation
Whether self-generated or asked by someone else, the question,
once formed, leads to the generation of potential answers or hypotheses.
Like their scientific counterparts, intuitive hypotheses represent the
alternative plausible answers to the particular question. To borrow
Kruglanski and Ajzen's example, a person may want to know why his car
failed to start on a cold morning. The hypotheses consist of those
factors known or assumed to be associated with the normal functioning
of his engine— the battery, ignition, etc. The number of hypotheses
generated is determined by the knowledge and creativity of the in-
tuitive scientist. Someone who is totally ignorant about automobiles
would be hard pressed to generate many hypotheses to explain why his
car isn't working. On the other hand, a trained mechanic would be
able to list a variety of potential causes of the engine's failure.
In other contexts, the rival hypotheses may be provided by
someone else. In experiments, for example, the researcher may pose
the initial question and may accompany it with several potential
answers
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III. Problem Resolution
During this stage in the epistemic sequence, the individual
evaluates the relative plausibility of the competing hypotheses by
considering whether they are consistent or inconsistent with all the
available evidence. Consistent evidence increases the individual's
confidence in a hypothesis and inconsistent evidence weakens that
confidence
.
IV. Termination
It is possible, in principle, to have an indefinite number of
alternative hypotheses for any given question. Intuitive hypothesis-
testing could, then, proceed indefinitely. However, the epistemic
sequence is, in practice, bounded by several factors. The intuitive
scientist comes to accept one hypothesis and to reject the remainder
on the basis of the importance of the question, his or her tolerance
of ambiguity, the relative strength of support of one hypothesis over
others, plus a variety of motivational influences.
Testing Hypotheses: The Evidence Used
Perhaps the majority of the research on social judgment has been
concerned with the problem resolution phase of the epistemic sequence,
the stage during which the intuitive scientist tests the plausibility
of rival hypotheses. In order to assess those hypotheses the in-
dividual draws from his or her total store of knowledge that subset
which would constitute evidence for or against them. According to
Kruglanski et al, evidence is that knowledge or that set of beliefs
that is relevant to the proposition under consideration. They propose
that relevance can be defined as material implication. More formally,
some belief X is relevant to some hypothesis H
IFF { X ) H } or { H ) X } or { X ) H }
It is not clear that the concept of psychological relevance should be
made equivalent to the proposition of material equivalence as it is
defined in the calculus of formal logic. However, this definition is
sufficient to impart the reasonable assumption that two occurrences are
relevant if they co-vary and/or share common properties. Knowledge of
the traits and preferences of lawyers is relevant to the hypothesis
that Jack is a lawyer while the size of the group from which he came
is not because the former has co-varied with occupational standing
but the latter has not.
The "if and only if" condition of the definition serves to circum-
scribe the boundaries of relevant knowledge. However, within those
boundaries a wide range of beliefs are potentially relevant and could
be used to evaluate the strength of one or more hypotheses. Evidence
relevant to the hypothesis that Jack is a lawyer could include (in
addition to whatever is known about Jack) the traits of a single known
lawyer, the traits of several lawyers, and/or those of a stereo-
typical lawyer. Each meets the criterion of evidential relevance
and each could be used as the comparative base against which to judge
Jack's characteristics. In most cases, each would yield quite dif-
ferent judgments. Kruglanski's relevance definition does not aid in
predicting which type of evidence would be recalled from memory in any
judgmental task, nor is there a consensus in other theoretical views
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of the judgmental process. Although both specific examples and
stereotypical representations are assumed to be available in memory,
theories differ in suggesting which would be used as evidence.
In the cognitive literature considerable attention has been
devoted to explaining how individuals judge whether a given instance
or case belongs in one category or another. In the terminology of
lay epistemology, this is an evaluation of the hypothesis that a
particular person, object or event is a member of a certain group of
like persons, objects or events. One school of thought holds that
this decision is made by comparing the particular case not against
some known member of the category but against a cognitive summary
of the distinctive characteristics of the category. It is assumed
that, as a function of experience with multiple exemplars of a group,
people abstract its defining features and generate a prototype which
embodies those definitive aspects. There is little consensus as to
how a prototype should be precisely defined, but is is clear that it
represents the central tendency of the category. For groups identified
by qualitative attributes (i.e., groups which are defined by color,
form, etc.), the prototype consists of the modal values along those
attributes. When the exemplars of a category assume values on
quantitative dimensions, the prototype represents the mean or average
value on those dimensions. Differential salience or importance of
attributes is accomodated by a weighting parameter. Thus, the
prototype exists as some sort of mathematical combination of the
attributes of component exemplars, averaged over all exemplars in
the category. According to prototype models, people recognize and
classify new cases by comparing them to the stored prototype.
Most of the research on prototypes has employed non-social stimuli
(dot patterns, geometric forms, etc.) and considerable support for
this family of models exists in the cognitive literature (cf.
Bransford & Franks, 1971; Franks & Bransford, 1971; Posner & Keele,
1968)
.
Prototypes have also been introduced as an explanatory con-
cept in social judgments as well. Tversky and Kahneman's representa-
tiveness heuristic is, essentially, a judgment by prototype model.
Likewise, Abelson's (Abelson, 1976; Langer & Abelson, 1972; Schank &
Abelson, 1977) "scripts" are assumed to be cognitive representations
of the diagnostic features of types of social event sequences. More
recently, two investigations have examined the utility of the proto-
type model as an explanation of social categorization. Cantor and
Mischell (1977) and Tsujimoto (1978) explored how people use stored
information to make decisions about other people's traits. In both
studies, results appeared to support a comparison-to-prototype
explanation.
An alternative interpretation of the way in which people use
acquired information to make decisions about new instances is provided
by the "feature" family of models. They differ from prototypes in
that they assume that much more information about exemplars, such as
their component features, is used during judgmental tasks. In
prototype models, the component dimensions are assumed to be
independent, and the prototype is aggregated over all exemplars.
Thus, the individual category members themselves play no role in
determining the classification of new cases. Feature models challenge
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this assumption with the argument that such judgments are based on the
retrieval of information about the features of specific exemplars.
Included within the family of feature models are the "proximity"
model (Reed, 1972), the "context theory of classification" (Medin &
Schaffer, 1978), and the "property set" model (Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth,
1977). Note, too, that Tversky and Kahneman's availability heuristic
proposes that many judgments are based on the retrieval of specific
examples that are similar to the instance under consideration. Brooks
(1978) also suggests that, under certain learning and task conditions,
people reason by comparing the specific case at hand against its most
similar exemplar and not against a stereotypical representation of the
entire category of similar events.
In short, there are several, and often competing, views of the
evidence people recall in testing their intuitive hypotheses. The
use of one type over another is surely dictated by several factors,
perhaps the most important of which is the variability of the
hypothesized class of people or events. In homogeneous groups with
exemplars which differ little from one another, a prototype will
suffice as an accurate and economical summary of the characteristics
defining group membership. However, for "ill-defined" categories
composed of multiple exemplars which vary widely, the prototype can
only embody the more abstract commonalities. As the prototype
becomes more abstract it is a less adequate representation of any
single exemplar, it is less adequate as a summarization of the entire
category, and it is less useful as comparative evidence in making
predictions about any new instance. In other words, while both
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prototypes and memory for specific exemplars may be relevant as
evidence in testing hypotheses, their degree of relevance is limited
by the variability of the categories to which they refer. Evidence
can be ordered in terms of its relevance by adding another term in
Kruglanski's definition of relevance which substitutes "to the extent
that" for "if and only if." This additional statement provides for
a ranking of different evidence in terms of their probative values.
Testing Hypotheses: The Process Used
Having gathered the relevant evidence, the task of the intuitive
scientist is to test the competing hypotheses in light of the assembled
evidence. The way in which this testing proceeds is not well
articulated. It is often proposed, for example, that individuals
assess the "match" between the evidence and the current instance or
that they "compare" its evidentiary features with those of the
problematic case. The actual mechanisms involved in "matching" or
"comparing" are not clearly defined. In the theory of lay epistemology
,
it is proposed that people accept or reject hypotheses by applying the
"principle of consistency," by considering whether the evidence
relevant to a hypothesis is consistent with that hypothesis.
Unfortunately, the consistency principle is not developed within the
theory. It stands as a general rule and is defined as equivalent to
logical consistency: Evidence and a hypothesis are consistent to the
extent that they mutually imply each other. An example used to illus-
trate this concept is the following. The hypothesis that John is
a good student would be held on the evidence that he does his homework
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because doing homework is consistent with being a good student.
Clearly, empirical research is needed to lend more precision to the
principle of psychological consistency. At best, the consistency rule
refers to a generalized mode of problem resolution. A handful of
theoretical positions have been proposed as more definite explanations
of the comparison process. These models may be viewed as types or
components of judgments of consistency.
Both prototype and feature models assume that people compare the
characteristics of the new case against those of the hypothesized
category by computing a metric distance between the two. According
to these models, the attributes of the new instance and those of the
recalled instance (either a prototype or a specific exemplar) can be
thought of as occupying some psychological space. In assessing the
similarities between the two entities, the individual is said to
calculate their psychological distance, and this distance is a measure
of their congruence. In prototype models, the recognition of new
instances is proposed to be a function of their distance from proto-
type. In feature models, the distance of the new case from the
exemplar is assumed to determine the classification judgment.
Tversky (1977) has offered a non-metric model of the way in
which people assess similarity. According to his contrast model,
similarity between entities is a function of the ratio of common to
non-common attributes.
Brooks (1978) has proposed that in many tasks, individuals adopt
an "analogical" rather than an analytical strategy of comparison.
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However, he has not specified exactly how that analogical judgment
might be made.
CHAPTER III
ERRORS AND BIASES IN INTUITIVE HYPOTHESIS-TESTING
The theory of lay epistemology
, as well as a great many other
approaches, likens the naive problem-solver to an intuitive scientist-
generating hypotheses and then assessing the strength of their
evidential support. While both the goals and the process may be
fundamentally the same for the intuitive and the formal scientist,
vast differences exist in their problem-solving methods. In teasing
out the effects of hypothesized causal factors, or in controlling
extraneous effects, the researcher can hold some variables constant
while manipulating others. The intuitive scientist has no such
measure of control. He or she must disentangle the effects of causal
factors sheerly by cognitive activity alone, by trying to figure out
what the results of such disentanglement might have been. This dis-
tinction is a difference between active experimentation and "passive
cognition" (Hammond, 1978). Furthermore, the research scientist can
suspend a judgment to accept or reject an hypothesis until empirical
evidence, collected under relatively pristine conditions, is
assembled. The intuitive scientist must usually make his or her
decision much more quickly and his or her evidence typically consists
not of a newly acquired set of unbiased data, but rather of what he o
she can remember. Thus, since his or her evidence is retrieved from
memory, the intuitive scientist's hypothesis-testing is vulnerable to
all the factors known to influence memory storage and recall. The
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evidence is often incomplete, it may have been originally acquired in
haste, or incidentally, and it will erode over time. Under all these
disadvantages, judgmental errors are bound to occur.
In most of the social judgment literature, "bias" and "error"
have been used interchangeably to refer to any source which intrudes
upon the subjective inference process and yields a judgment discrepant
from the normative solution. Kruglanski and Ajzen (Note 1) argue that
it is useful to preserve a distinction between the two terms. Here,
bias refers to a tendency to prefer, on arbitrary grounds, one hypoth-
esis over another. Errors, on the other hand, occur when information
is unwittingly used incorrectly, i.e., when the subjective weight
attached to some evidence does not conform to its "objective" weight. 3
Biases arise from the motivations of the decision-maker and reflect
his or her wishes or desires. Errors are traceable to the information
used enroute to the decision. According to this distinction, biases
are the result of a deliberate and active selection of preferred
evidence; errors are the result of unintentional flaws in the storage
or recall of relevant evidence.
Biases and errors can occur at any stage of the epistemic
sequence. "Wishful thinking," for example, may lead one to prefer
one potential hypothesis over other alternatives and to seek its
supporting evidence while ignoring information supportive of the
unattractive hypotheses. In instances such as this, the intuitive
judge has both self-serving and discrediting evidence available, but
chooses to select, or attach unwarranted weight to, that evidence which
tends to confirm the desired hypothesis. In their paper, Kruglanski
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and Ajzen discuss this and other motivational biases and their intrusion
into the reasoning process. (See also Beckman, 1970; Freize & Weiner,
1971; Heider, 1958; Johnson, Feigenbaum, & Weiby, 1964; Jones & Davis,
1965; Kelley, 1967; Miller & Ross, 1975; and Ross, 1977 for other
discussions of motivated biases, particularly as they occur in
attributional judgments.)
According to the present interpretation, cognitive errors occur
because of the information used in testing hypotheses. For any given
hypothesis, a wide variety of evidence is potentially available in
memory. However, not all that information is accessed during the
epistemic process. Retrieval is influenced by factors which increase
the "availability" of some information, factors such as salience,
primacy, recency, and so on (cf. Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). While
these may be unintentional constraints on the retrieval of evidence,
their effects nevertheless produce inaccurate judgments.
In addition to these factors which are known to influence the
accessibility of stored information, there may be other unintentional
intrusions into the epistemic process. In some recent research,
Snyder and his colleagues have proposed the idea that the hypothesis
itself may create subtle criteria for the selection of relevant
evidence. The basic premise is that formulated hypotheses tend to be
tested by a "confirmatory strategy." Rather than attending to both
supportive and non-supportive evidence, people tend to assess the
plausibility of a hypothesis by selectively retrieving and attending
to more evidence which confirms it. This tendency is not assumed to
be motivated by the desires of the individual (it has been shown to
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occur even when subjects are given incentives to be accurate), but is
considered to be an unintentional error in intuitive hypothesis-testing.
In one study in this research program subjects were led to believe
that they would conduct interviews with other students (Snyder &
Swann, 1978). Subjects were told that their task was to use the
interviews to gather information to test a hypothesis. Some subjects
were asked to find out if the interviewee was an extravert. Other
subjects were to assess if the interviewee was an introvert. After
presentation of the respective hypotheses, subjects were given a
profile describing the traits, preferences, and behaviors of typical
extraverts (or introverts), and a list of potential questions that
could be asked of the interviewee to test the given hypothesis. Some
suggested questions were ones that would, according to the judgment
of pre-test subjects, be asked of people known to be extraverts, some
would be asked of known introverts, and some were neutral. From these
potential questions subjects were asked to select 12 which would
enable them to link the interviewee's characteristics to those de-
scribed in the profile.
The results showed that subjects chose to ask questions that
solicited hypothesis-confirming evidence about twice as often as they
chose questions that solicited disconf irming evidence. Subjects in
the extravert condition tended to select questions characteristically
asked of persons already known to be extraverts, while subjects in the
introvert condition preferred questions typically asked of known
introverts. Although the disconf irming evidence should be important
in any decision to accept or reject the stated hypothesis, subjects
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overwhelmingly favored the confirmatory evidence.
The tendency to adopt this confirmatory strategy was replicated
under several conditions in several experiments. It occurred when the
origin of the hypothesis was varied, i.e., whether it was indicated by
the results of a valid personality test or simply emerged from an in-
formal character sketch (Snyder & Swann, 1978, Experiment 1). The
confirmatory strategy was also unaffected by the likelihood of the
hypothesis, where likelihood was manipulated by base rates (Experiment
3), and was similarly unaffected by substantial incentives for judg-
mental accuracy (Experiment 4). Furthermore, even when subjects were
testing hypotheses about themselves, they tended to choose confirmatory
evidence even when the hypothesis was not necessarily flattering
(Snyder & Skrypnek, Note 2) . The only condition under which the effect
was not obtained was when no hypothesis was presented. In the absence
of either personality profile, subjects were more likely to select
questions from both the Introvert and Extravert domain (Snyder & Swann,
Note 3).
While these investigations appear to offer fairly convincing
support for the pervasive confirmatory error in intuitive hypothesis-
testing, certain of the procedures used undermine the validity of the
findings. Specifically, the instructions to subjects may have provided
strong demand characteristics. Recall that they were asked to choose
questions that would enable them to link the characteristics of the
interviewee with those in the profile of the typical extravert (or
introvert). Under these instructions, subjects may have interpreted
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their task not as one of unbiased hypothesis-testing, but rather as
one of matching the profiled characteristics with those of the
interviewee. If the task were seen as such, it would be reasonable to
select those questions for which a match could be obtained, i.e.,
questions which would provide confirming evidence.
In another series of experiments, the confirmatory strategy was
further explored. In this series (Snyder & Cantor, 1979), two
important changes were made. First, different instructions and pro-
cedures were employed. Secondly, subjects tested the hypothesis by
retrieving evidence from memory rather than by gathering new evidence
once the hypothesis was presented.
Snyder and Cantor prepared a four page narrative about one week
in the life of a woman named Jane. The account was structured to
include examples of Jane behaving in an extraverted fashion as well as
instances in which she acted in an introverted manner. (On the basis
of this account, pretest subjects judged Jane to be both moderately extra-
verted and moderately introverted.) In the first experimental session,
subjects read the narrative and answered 20 questions about specific
factual details of the story. In the second session, conducted two
days later, subjects were randomly assigned to either the Extravert
or Introvert hypothesis condition. Subjects in the former were asked
to judge how well-suited Jane was for the job of real estate sales-
person. Those in the Introvert condition were to assess Jane's
suitability for the position of research librarian. All subjects
were given a profile of the ideal person for the respective positions.
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The extravert profile indicated that the ideal real estate sales-
person was outgoing, talkative, bold, and so on. The ideal librarian
was described as reserved, quiet, studious, soft-spoken and discrete.
Before making their judgments of job suitability, subjects were
asked to write down all the facts from the story they considered to be
relevant to assessing Jane's qualifications for the job in question.
Finally, subjects were to rate, on a six-point scale, how well-suited
Jane was for the hypothesized position.
The results of the first experiment in this series showed no
difference in judgments of job suitability between the Extravert and
Introvert conditions. However, subjects in both conditions tended to
report hypothesis-confirming evidence as relevant more often than
disconf irming evidence. In a second study, the idealized profile was
omitted and subjects were free to use their own notions of the best
real estate salesperson or the ideal research librarian. Another
dependent measure was also added in this second experiment. After
deciding Jane's suitability for the hypothesized position, subjects
were asked to judge her suitability for the other job as well. Under
these conditions, Snyder and Cantor found that subjects rated Jane
as more suitable for the hypothesized job than for the other position,
even though the story about Jane provided equal evidence for both
hypotheses
.
Before proceeding to the explanations proffered for these
obtained effects, the distinction between this and some similar
research should be made clear. Several studies have investigated the
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influence of "ancillary" information on the recall and interpretat
of previously-learned information. Snyder and Uranowitz (1978), for
example, presented subjects with a case history of a woman called
Betty. Later, and depending upon the experimental condition to which
they were assigned, subjects were told that she had pursued either a
lesbian or a heterosexual life style. Subjects were then given a test
of their recall of the initial case history (which was, according to
pretest subjects, equally supportive of either kind of life style).
Snyder and Uranowitz found that when subjects erred in recall, their
errors were in the direction of the labelling accomplished via the
ancillary information. That is, subjects who were later told that
Betty was a lesbian misremembered that her life's events were con-
sistent with stereotypical beliefs about that life style. Subjects in
the heterosexual labelling condition also misremembered what they
had originally read about Betty such that they recalled her life's
events in a manner consistent with typical assumptions about hetero-
sexual women.
In a similar study, Spiro's (1977) subjects read about an engaged
couple. The man was said to be opposed to having children and, after
discussing this with his fiancee finds that she enthusiastically
agrees (or, for some subjects, unequivocally disagrees) with him. In
the ancillary information presented later, subjects learn either that
the couple eventually were married or that they broke off their
engagement
.
When subjects in this experiment were tested for their memory of
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the first passage, Spiro found that they consistently erred by dis-
counting or forgetting facts that were inconsistent with the final
outcomes and over-emphasizing those that were consistent with the
knowledge they later acquired. For example, subjects who were original-
ly told that the financee vehemently disagreed about having children
and later learned that the couple proceeded to get married forgot that
the fiancee disagreed, or remembered that she was only mildly opposed
to her husband's opinion.
Both these studies evidence the reconstructive facility of
memory. Information is not simply stored as it is presented, but is
actively interpreted and changed by other information. Subjects in
these experiments reconstructed their initial knowledge to make it
consistent with the information they later obtained. The difference
between this work and that of Snyder and Cantor is that in the former,
the ancillary information was presented as a factual outcome.
Despite what they had learned in the original passage, subjects came
to know that the woman was either a lesbian or a heterosexual. Like-
wise, Spiro 's subjects knew that regardless of their agreement or
disagreement on the issue of children, the couple eventually either got
married or broke up. In Snyder and Cantor's studies, the ancillary
information is not a factual bit of knowledge. It is simply a
hypothesis or a possibility that must be evaluated in light of their
previously-stored knowledge. When later information is presented
as fact, there is apparently a substantial tendency to reconcile it
with previous beliefs, to make a coherent whole out of all related
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knowledge, regardless of apparent discrepancies in parts of that
knowledge. However, when the subsequent proposition is stated not as
a fact but as a possibility, there should be no such tendency. Snyder
and Cantor's results, however, appear to show that the same kind of
errors are made.
Snyder and Cantor suggest that their findings point to a funda-
mental feature of intuitive reasoning. In testing hypotheses about
other people, individuals tend to adopt the confirmatory strategy,
asking, in effect, "What do I know about this person that would enable
me to support my hypothesis?" rather than asking, "What do I know that
would enable me to confirm or disconfirm my hypothesis?" This
strategy produces an error in that it tends to increase the likelihood
that the hypothesis will be accepted when, as in these studies, both
supportive and contradictory evidence is potentially available.
Snyder and Cantor point out that this tendency may arise as a
result of either of two mechanisms. First, the error may occur during
the retrieval of stored evidence. The statement of the hypothesis it-
self may induce the selective recall of stored instances or facts
that support it. This selective recall could occur if memory is
organized in terms of superordinate conceptual categories, and, under
them, their defining exemplars. Given such a cognitive structure,
subjects in these experiments may have ordered Jane's behaviors under
conceptual categories denoting introversion and extraversion as they
read the narrative. The presentation of the hypothesis activates the
conceptual categories implied by that hypothesis and the task becomes
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one of finding the goodness of fit between Jane's behaviors and
exemplars ordered under the superordinate conceptual category.
For subjects in the Extravert condition, for instance, the task is to
match behaviors stored as specific examples of Jane's extraversion
against those stored as generalized exemplars of that superordinate
concept. Disconfirming evidence is less easily accessed because it
is stored as examples of a different category. This interpretation
would be consistent with models of memory which view stored information
as a network of hierarchical links and nodes. According to these
models, memory is interrogated in a sequential fashion, beginning with
higher-order generalities and traversing downward until specific
behaviors or characteristics are located. (For a discussion of models
of this type, see Anderson's HAM theory, 1976, and Collins and Loftus'
"Spreading activation" Model. Hastie and Kumar, 1979, among others,
propose that memory for persons may particularly be organized and
scanned in this manner.)
The confirmatory strategy may be due to an altogether different
mechanism. Both confirming and disconfirming evidence may be equally
retrievable and recalled in the same way, but greater diagnostic
weight may be attached to the former. This would represent more of
an active and deliberate strategy on the part of the intuitive scientist
and would reflect the subjective belief that the presence of the
hypothesized traits and characteristics are worth more as evidence than
the presence of alternative traits or characteristics. In other
words, confirming evidence is not more available than disconfirming
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evidence, but is perceived to be more relevant in testing hypotheses.
Several of the "illusory correlation" (cf. Smedslund, 1965) findings
have been interpreted as demonstrating this subjective belief. Einhorn
and Hogarth (1978) provide a good discussion of features of people's
ordinary lives and the way in which they acquire information which
promote this belief and lead to its unchallenged persistence.
Snyder and Cantor note that their experiments do not resolve the
competing interpretations. Their obtained results may be due to
either "differential retrieval" or "differential relevance." The
research proposed below is designed to explore the contributions of
these two mechanisms in intuitive hypothesis-testing.
CHAPTER IV
THE MECHANISMS INVOLVED IN INTUITIVE HYPOTHESIS-TESTING-
DIFFERENTIAL RECALL AND DIFFERENTIAL RELEVANCE
This research was designed to gain further knowledge of the
apparent confirmatory error, and the conditions which promote or suppres
its occurrence. Snyder and his colleagues have shown, in a succession
of related studies, that when they are asked to list what they consider
to be relevant in evaluating a proposition or hypothesis, individuals
reliably report more confirming than disconfirming evidence. There are
also some data which suggest that the tendency to favor confirming
evidence while testing a hypothesis translates to a tendency to
unjustifiably accept it. But the evidence for this effect of a
confirmatory strategy on the final judgment is unconvincing. After
making a decision about one hypothesis, subjects were asked to turn
around and use the same information to test an alternative hypothesis.
Subjects in this experiment (Snyder & Cantor, 1979, Experiment 2) were
much more likely to accept the first than the second of the two
hypotheses. It is not surprising that after making one considered
judgment, individuals do not then immediately argue against it by
affirming its alternative to be more true.
There is then ample evidence suggesting that the confirmatory
strategy intrudes on intermediate cognitive processes used enroute to a
final judgment about an hypothesis, but little evidence that it affects
that final judgment itself. There is also little indication why that
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intrusion occurs. The suggested mechanisms are that the hypothes
becomes a retrieval cue prompting recall for favorable evidence, but
providing no such retrieval prompt for disconfirming evidence. The
second proposed explanation suggests that the error comes not primarily
during the retrieval of available information, but during the evaluation
of that information. According to this view, recalled evidence is
evaluated in light of the hypothesis such that confirming evidence is
seen as more favorable, disconfirming evidence is viewed as less
inconsistent and (at least some) irrelevant information comes to be
interpreted as supportive of the hypothesis. The research described
here included dependent measures of both the recall and interpretive
processes to better untangle the source of the confirmatory error.
The experimental design also varied, through different instructions,
the orientation participants brought to the hypothesis-testing situation
to determine under what conditions the confirmatory error is most likely
to occur.
One group of subjects (Uncritical Orientation) participated in a
replication of Snyder and Cantor's (1979) study: They were to test
one of two opposing hypotheses and, before making their judgments
about it, listed all the evidence they considered relevant. Under
these instructions, the confirmatory error is most likely to occur.
The single hypothesis can serve as a retrieval cue enhancing the recall
of hypothesis-consistent information while providing no such organizing
schema for disconfirming evidence. Furthermore, and apart from any
potential effects of the hypothesis on retrieval, members of this group
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were free to evaluate whatever evidence they recalled in light of the
hypothesis, interpreting "relevant" as "confirming" evidence.
Two other groups of participants tested hypotheses under conditions
designed to lessen the biasing effects of the hypothesis. After the
hypothesis was stated, members of these groups were asked to list all
the information they could recall, and not just a subset of "relevant"
knowledge. Although the hypothesis was still available as a potential
organizing schema for selective retrieval of favorable evidence, their
instructions to recall all their pertinent information prompted
these subjects to retrieve disconfinning evidence that might not be
organized under the hypothesis schema, as well as any confirming
evidence that is. These recall instructions should diminish one of the
possible sources of the confirmatory error— the potential for the
hypothesis to exclude from recall much of the disconfirming evidence.
The use of a confirmatory strategy in judgment may best be regarded
as another cognitive rule-of-thumb , a short cut method for quick and
intuitive hypothesis-testing. Its presence may, therefore, be limited
to instances in which individuals give relatively cursory and uncritical
attention to the proposition under consideration. (If this is the case,
its use would be most expected when the hypothesis deals with subjectively
unimportant people or events.) In other judgment situations, when
individuals are prompted, either because of the salience of the issue
or because of specific instructions to do so, they may be much more
deliberate in the way they evaluate the pertinent evidence at hand,
and errors in their hypothesis-testing process may then be less frequent
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and less pronounced. The present study incorporated these more
critical conditions. In addition to being prompted to retrieve all
their available knowledge, participants in these two groups (Critical
Orientation) were asked to rate each item of recalled evidence for
its implications for the hypothesis.
The instruction to be deliberate both in recall and in evaluation
of evidence should diminish, but not necessarily eliminate, the
tendency to adopt a confirmatory strategy in hypothesis-testing. If
that strategy is used, members of the two Critical Orientation groups
may, like those in the Uncritical Orientation group, recall more
confirming than disconfirming evidence. If there is a tendency to
interpret evidence in light of the hypothesis, that tendency will be
reflected in the relevance ratings these subjects assigned to the items
of evidence they recalled. Since this study includes measures of
what individuals retrieve from memory and how they interpreted that
evidence, the source of the confirmatory error can be more accurately
determined.
The two Critical Orientation groups differed in the number of hypo-
theses tested and in the prior probability of those hypotheses.
Members of one group (Critical Orientation-Single Hypothesis) tested
one of two contrasting hypotheses (Jane's suitability for either the
Introvert or the Extravert occupation) and that hypothesis carried
one of three levels of prior probability. The critical mode of
evaluating evidence may be adopted in some cases but not in others.
When the decision to accept, reject or estimate the likelihood of the
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hypothesis has important personal ramifications or when individuals
are, as subjects in this group were, specifically asked to do so, they
will be more inclined to be systematic in their hypothesis-testing and
will be less likely to rely on a short cut approach. Other features
of the hypothesis-testing situation may also promote or suppress the
tendency to follow a confirmatory strategy. The prior probability of
the hypothesis, independent of its current evidential support, would
seem to be a potentially important factor and one which could act on
either the retrieval process or on the evaluation of the evidence.
Recall that Snyder and Swann (1978, Experiment 3) also suspected that
this variable may influence the process of testing a hypothesis.
However, they chose to manipulate likelihood by varying base rates.
Low prior odds were created by informing some subjects that Jane was a
member of a sorority of which only seven of 30 members were extraverts
(or introverts). High prior probabilities were created by informing
the remainder of the subjects that 23 of the 30 members of Jane's
sorority were extraverts (or introverts) . In preceding sections it has
been shown that base rates such as these are not equivalent to sub-
jective prior probabilities since they merely summarize the frequency
distributions of people in categories but impart no explanation for
that distribution. The fact that Snyder and Swann found no effect of
this manipulation is, therefore, not surprising. In this study a
potentially more effective manipulation was employed.
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Prior odds were varied by telling participants in this group
(Critical Orientation-Single Hypothesis) of the judgments of others
who had previously informally tested the same hypothesis. Some learned
that others had judged the hypothesis to be true; other members of this
group learned that the hypothesis was, in the judgment of others, more
likely to be false. For a third group of participants, the hypothesis
carried no prior probability. They received no information about the
previous judgment of others.
The second of the groups given the Critical Orientation tested
both of the alternative hypotheses. When two contrasting propositions
are considered simultaneously, evidence which tends to confirm one tends
to disconfirm the other. If the hypothesis serves as an organizing
schema, the presentation of both alternatives should make available in
memory evidence which supports both hypotheses as well as evidence
which disconfirms both. The retrieval process should not, therefore,
favor one of the alternatives over the other.
Like those who tested a single hypothesis under the critical
orientation, these subjects who tested both hypotheses were asked to
attempt to recall all the prior information they had learned, and were
instructed to be deliberate in evaluating whatever they recalled,
assigning relevance ratings to each item of evidence.
To summarize the experimental conditions, one group (Uncritical
Orientation) tested either the Introvert or the Extravert hypothesis
and, before doing so, listed that evidence they considered relevant
to their judgment. No measures of the interpretation of evidence were
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taken from members of this group. A second group (Critical Orientation-
Single Hypothesis) also tested one of the two hypotheses, and that
hypothesis carried either a low prior likelihood, a high prior likeli-
hood, or no prior probability. To diminish any tendency to retrieve a
preponderance of confirming evidence, members of this group were asked
to attempt to recall all their archival knowledge and to critically
evaluate each bit of that evidence before deciding to accept or reject
the hypothesis. The third group of participants (Critical Orientation-
Both Hypotheses) tested both the Introvert and the Extravert hypotheses.
These participants had no information about the prior likelihood of the
hypotheses they were considering. Before making their decision about
the hypotheses members of this group were also asked to think back and
recall all the pertinent knowledge they had learned and to critically
evaluate that evidence for its implications for both hypotheses.
With these three groups it is possible to determine more about
the source of the confirmatory strategy. If it is due to the effects
of the hypothesis on the retrieval of evidence from memory, all partici-
pants will recall more confirming than disconfirming evidence.
However, if the instructions to attempt to recall all available
evidence are effective in making available in memory disconf irming as
well as confirming evidence, those who tested their single hypothesis
under critical orientation should retrieve proportionately more dis-
confirming evidence than those who were not prompted with specific
recall instructions.
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If the confirmatory error operates during the interpretation of
recalled evidence, the relevance ratings provided by those in the
Critical Orientation groups will reflect that source of bias. If
members of these two groups, despite their instructions to be careful
in evaluating the evidence and despite the fact that the prior knowledge
offers the same amount of confirming and disconf irming evidence,
interpret most of what they recall as supportive of the hypothesis,
the hypothesis will have been shown to powerfully affect the way in
which information is construed.
Method
Participants
.
One hundred thirty-five male and female undergraduates
enrolled in introductory psychology courses participated, in small
groups, for course credit.
Procedure . The present study employed materials and procedures
based on those used by Snyder and Cantor (1979) . It was conducted in
two sessions. During the first, participants were provided with an
archival store of information. In the second, they used that informa-
tion to test hypotheses under different conditions.
First Session . To provide the prior information, all
participants read an identical account of events in the life of a
woman named Jane. Two 'days later they used that information to test
one or two of the complementary hypotheses: that Jane was well-suited
for a job that required the personal attributes of the prototypic
introvert (Research Librarian) or that she was well-suited for a job
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that required the personal attributes of a prototypic extravert (Real
Estate Salesperson). The narrative about Jane provided considerable
support for either hypothesis: In different situations and at different
times Jane was as likely to behave an introverted or extraverted
fashion. The descriptors of Jane's behavior were formed using trait
terms which, by themselves, were shown by Cantor and Mischell (1977)
to be normatively associated with introversion or extraversion. The
narrative contained eleven bits of evidence characterizing Jane as an
introvert ("Jane was shy and timid at the supermarket") and nine
instances in which her behavior was decidedly more extraverted ("Jane
remained friendly and outgoing while jogging despite her long day at
work")
.
Errors in judgment may occur because, in light of the hypothesis,
confirming evidence is seen as more confirming and disconf irming
evidence is seen as less disconf irming
.
This type of error is testable
in the current experimental design by examining the relevance ratings
assigned by participants in the two Critical Orientation groups
(Single and Both Hypotheses) who were asked to rate each item of
evidence for its relevance to the hypothesis. In addition to this
tendency to interpret the positive and negative evidence in a manner
consistent with the hypothesis, irrelevant evidence may also be
interpreted in light of the hypothesis. To explore this potentially
biasing effect of the hypothesis, the narrative about Jane was modified
to include ten instances in which her behavior was irrelevant to
either the introvert or extravert hypothesis. Irrelevant evidence was
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created using descriptors which were, in Cantor and Mischell's study,
shown to be unrelated to the introversion-extraversion dimension
(e.g., "Jane was patient and courteous at work").
After reading the four page narrative (a copy of which appears in
Appendix A), all participants completed a brief test of their recall
of the narrative. None of the questions in this test concerned Jane's
personality or job suitability. The test was included to ensure that
all participants, regardless of the group to which they were assigned,
had equivalent prior knowledge available when later testing hypotheses
about Jane.
Second Session
.
Two days later all participants were randomly
assigned to test one hypothesis, the contrasting hypothesis, or both
hypotheses, and to do so under one of two instructions. One group of
30 participants (Uncritical Orientation) took part in essentially a
replication of Snyder and Cantor's second experiment. They tested
either the Introvert or Extravert hypothesis, but before doing so were
asked to list whatever information they could recall about Jane
that they considered relevant to their judgment. In this study, after
these participants listed the relevant evidence, they were given the
opportunity to list any additional information they could retrieve
from memory. Finally, they were asked to rate Jane's suitability for
the hypothesized job on a six point scale anchored at the extremes
by "not at all suited" and "very well suited."
The second group of 90 participants (Critical Orientation-Single
Hypothesis) also tested one of the two hypotheses, but did so under
instructions to be more critical in their recall and evaluation of the
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evidence. Their instructions asked them to first list all the
information they could recall from the narrative. After listing that
information they were asked to rate each bit of evidence for its
implications for the hypothesis. These relevance ratings ranged
from
-3 to +3 with the negative ratings indicating that the evidence
recalled connoted Jane's unsuitedness for the hypothesized job, while
the positive ratings connoted her job suitability.
In addition, these participants were further randomly assigned to
one of three levels of the prior probability manipulation. In the Low
Prior Probability level, participants learned that, in the opinion of
Jane's friends, "she might not be good" in the hypothesized job. Those
in the High Prior Probability level learned that Jane's friends
"thought she might be good" at the job under consideration. A third
level (No Prior Probability) was denied information about the opinion
of Jane's friends.
The final group of 15 participants (Critical Orientation-Both
Hypotheses) tested both the Introvert and Extravert hypotheses. Their
task was to judge how well-suited Jane was for the position of real-
estate salesperson and how well-suited she would be as a research
librarian. Note that these instructions did not ask for a relative
judgment of Jane's suitability for one job in comparison to her
suitability for the alternative. Instead, they instructed these
participants to give equal and independent attention to both hypotheses.
The order in which the hypotheses were evaluated was counter-balanced
across subjects.
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Before their final judgment of job suitability, participants in
this group, like those who tested a single hypothesis under the
critical orientation, listed all the information they could recall
from the narrative and rated each part of that evidence on the six
point relevance scale for its implication for the hypotheses. Thus,
each item recalled by these subjects carried two relevance ratings:
one for its implications for the Introvert hypothesis and one for
what it implied about the Extravert hypothesis.
CHAPTER V
RESULTS
Equivalence of the Prior Information
The test of factual information was included at the end of the
first experimental session to ensure that all participants had equiva-
lent knowledge potentially available during the second session when they
put that knowledge to use. An analysis of the number of errors made on
that test showed no differences across the three groups, F = 1.45, p>. 24
Those who tested both hypotheses made, on the average, 4.60 errors. In
the two remaining groups, the average number of errors was 3.86 and
3.90. Thus, there is no evidence of systematic differences in archival
information in advance of hypothesis-testing.
Manipulation Check: Ambivalence of the Prior Information
The narrative about Jane was designed to be equivalently supportive
of both the Introvert and Extravert hypotheses. Analysis of the job
suitability judgments made by subjects who tested both hypotheses
suggests that the narrative was so perceived. These subjects judged
that, on the basis of the prior information they recalled, Jane was
as suited for the introverted position of research librarian (X = 3.33)
as she was for the more extraverted occupation of real-estate sales-
person (X = 2.87), _t = .94,
_p
>
- 35 -
Three additional analyses were undertaken to further ensure the
ambivalence of the archival information. Two independent judges
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counted the number of introvert, extravert, irrelevant and ambivalent
items of information recalled by participants in this group, using the
list of trait descriptors provided and tested by Cantor and Mischell
(1977) as guides. If the narrative were imbalanced and favored one
hypothesis over the other, there would be a tendency to recall more of
the over-represented evidence. An examination of the number of
introvert (X = 1.00) and extravert items (X = 1.47) showed that there
was no such differential recall by these subjects, t 1.10, p >.25.
The foregoing results pertain to the "objective" connotation of
the descriptors in the narrative and show that those in the group who
tested both hypotheses recalled an equal number of items which, by
themselves, are normatively associated with introversion as they
did items normatively associated with extraversion
. But the subjective
interpretation of these items may change when they are embedded within
a larger body of information. To examine the way in which the items
were interpreted, the number of items assigned positive relevance
ratings for the two hypotheses was counted. As expected, this
analysis revealed that some items which, by themselves, do not distin-
guish between introversion and extraversion came to be perceived as
supportive of the hypotheses. Whereas according to the ratings of the
independent judges, subjects listed, on the average, only about two
items which are "objectively" or normatively associated with intro-
version or extraversion, the participants themselves judged that some
seven items were relevant to the introversion/extraversion distinction.
However, the number of pro-hypothesis interpretations did not differ
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between the two hypotheses. These subjects who tested both hypotheses
interpreted some three items (X = 3.13) as implying Jane's suitability
for the introverted job and about three (X = 3.53) as connoting her
suitability for the alternative occupation t =
.51, p >.60.
Thus, the same number of recalled items were perceived as pro-
viding support for the introvert and the extravert hypotheses. A final
comparison was made to ensure that the two hypotheses were supported
to the same extent. The positive (pro-hypotheses) relevance ratings
were summed for each of the two hypotheses and compared. No dif-
ferences were found. The sum of the pro-Introvert ratings (X = 10.93)
was the same as the sum of the pro-Extravert ratings (X = 8.20),
1(1,14) = 1.09,
_p > .40.
All of these results support the assumption that the prior infor-
mation about Jane was balanced and could confirm either hypothesis;
participants who tested them both recalled the same number of items
which are normatively associated with introversion and extraversion
.
Furthermore, apart from the objective connotations of the evidence,
the participatns themselves interpreted an equal number of items to
be supportive of the two hypotheses. Finally, those items which
implied Jane's suitability for one occupation did so to the same extent
as the items which implied her suitability for the alternative occupa-
tion. In short, these findings suggest that evidence favoring both
hypotheses was equally available and both hypotheses were equally
supported by that evidence. The means associated with these findings
are shown in Table 1.
TABLE 1
AMBIVALENCE OF THE PRIOR INFORMATION
HYPOTHESIS
INTROVERT EXTRAVEPT
Job suitability judgment 3.33 2.87
Number of recalled items "objectively"
supporting the hypothesis 1.00 1.47
Number of recalled items subjectively
interpreted as supporting the
hypothesis 3.13 3.53
Sum of pro-hypothesis relevance
ratings 10.93 8.20
All judgments were made by subjects who tested both hypotheses.
None of the differences between the two hypotheses is significant.
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It may be argued that although the hypotheses were presented
simultaneously, the decision to accept or reject them was necessarily
made in sequence and that the confirmatory error could have operated
such that the first hypothesis was favored over the second (as
happened under somewhat different procedures in Snyder and Cantor's
(1979) second experiment). In the present study, the order of the
judgments was counter-balanced. This would ensure that, across all
subjects in this group, no systematic differences between the two
hypotheses would emerge. But it would also mask any order effects of
the two judgments within individual participants. To make certain
that these participants did not follow a biased procedure which led
them to favor the first over the second hypothesis, the sequence in
which the two judgments were made was analyzed. No order effects were
obtained. The first job suitability assessment was equivalent to the
second (X = 3.2 and 3.0), indicating that these subjects were quite
able to independently evaluate the two hypotheses, that they were
not more likely to accept the first at the expense of the second, and
that their judgment of Jane's suitability for one job did not
necessarily imply her unsuitability for the alternative.
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No Effect of the Prior Probability Manipulation
One interest of this research was the potential effect of the
hypothesis' prior probability on the processes employed to test it.
Here, prior likelihoods were varied by telling subjects in one group
(Critical Orientation-Single Hypothesis) of the opinions of Jane's
friends with respect to her suitability for the hypothesized
occupation. Some participants (High Prior Probability) were told that
Jane's friends thought she might be suited, others (Low Prior
Probability) learned that Jane's friends did not think she would be
suited. Still others (No Prior Probability) were denied any informa-
tion of this kind. They made their decision about the hypothesis in
the absence of any indication of its prior likelihood.
Apparently, this manipulation of prior odds was insufficient to
affect the hypothesis-testing process. It had no impact on job-
suitability judgments, on the type of evidence retrieved from memory,
or on the interpretation of that evidence.
Because of the lack of any effects of this manipulation, the
following analyses were pooled over the three levels of prior
probability.
Judgments of Job Suitability
Analysis of the job suitability judgments made by those who tested
one hypothesis revealed an unexpected main effect of the Introvert over
the Extravert hypothesis. In both the Critical and Uncritical
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Orientation groups, subjects who evaluated Jane's suitability for the
Introverted job judged that she was more suitable than did those who
tested her qualifications for the Extravert job.
However, this finding alone does not suggest that these subjects
followed a flawed strategy of hypothesis-testing. The presence of a
confirmatory error would only be indicated if they were led to a
conclusion different from that warranted by the normative or objective
strength of the evidence. The best measure of the "correct"
job-suitability judgment comes from those who tested both hypotheses
and who found both to be equally supported. If subjects who tested
one hypothesis differed in their judgments from those who had the
benefit of both hypotheses, a confirmatory error would be indicated.
Analyses of variance comparing the job suitability judgments of
those who tested both hypotheses against the same judgment made by
participants in the other two groups who tested either the Introvert or
Extravert hypothesis revealed no main effects nor interactions. That
is, participants who tested only one of the hypotheses were not
influenced to more strongly accept it than were those who tested both
hypotheses. The means are shown in Table 2.
TABLE 2
JOB SUITABILITY JUDGMENTS
HYPOTHESIS
INTROVERT EXTRAVERT
Critical Orient at ion-Bo th Hypotheses 3.33 2.87
Critical Orientation-Single Hypothesis 3.44 2.49
Uncritical Orientation 3.93 2.47
66
Effect of the Hypothesis on Information Recalled
The results of the previous analysis of job suitability judgments
suggest that participants in this study did not fall prey to any
confirmatory error, at least insofar as that error is evidenced by a
tendency to unjustifiably accept a stated hypothesis. The next series
of analyses examined the effect of the hypothesis on the kind of
information they recalled enroute to their final decision about that
hypothesis. For each of the participants who tested one of the two
hypotheses (i.e., those in the Critical Orientation-Single hypothesis
group and those in the Uncritical Orientation group), the proportions
of objectively confirming and disconf irming evidence recalled were
counted by dividing the number of pro-hypothesis items by the total
number of items recalled. A 2 ( Introvert-Extravert hypothesis) x 2
(Critical-Uncritical Orientation) x 2 (Conf irming-Disconf irming Evidence)
analysis of variance, with type of evidence as a repeated measures
factor, revealed a marginal interaction between the hypothesis and the
type of evidence reported. Those, under either orientation, who
tested the Introvert hypothesis recalled more confirming (X = 25%)
than disconfirming (X = 18.75%) evidence. However, this tendency was
not replicated for those who tested the Extravert hypothesis. This
interaction between the direction of the hypothesis and the type of
evidence recalled about it was marginally significant, F(l,116) =
2.71, p < .10. No significant differences distinguished between the
two Critical and Uncritical Orientation groups. Regardless of their
instructions, all subjects recalled essentially the same proportions
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of confirming and disconf irming evidence. Table 3 summarizes the types
and proportions of evidence recalled by members of both groups.
The results of this analysis suggest that any confirmatory error
is not principally due to the biasing effect of the hypothesis on
retrieval processes. There did seem to be some selective recall favor-
ing the Introvert hypothesis, but none favoring the Extravert hypothesis
(and, in fact, the opposite trend was more apparent).
Effect of the Hypothesis on the Interpretation of Evidence
An alternative explanation of the mechanism underlying the con-
firmatory error proposes that the hypothesis under consideration colors
the interpretation of whatever evidence is available: more evidence is
viewed as confirming and less is seen as disconfirming or irrelevant.
In order to determine whether, and to what extent, this mechanism is
responsible for the apparent confirmatory error, participants in two
of the groups were asked to provide relevance ratings of the items of
evidence they recalled. Those who tested either a single or both
hypotheses under Critical instructions rated each item recalled for its
implications for the hypothesis. Positive values were assigned to
items that, in the opinion of the subject, implied Jane's suitability
for the hypothesized job. If they judged the item to indicate Jane's
unsuitability , a negative value was assigned. Values of zero were
assigned to items recalled that were subjectively void of implications
for the hypothesis.
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TABLE 3
PROPORTIONS OF CONFIRMING AND DISCONFIRMING EVIDENCE RECALLED
Critical Orientation- Uncritical
Single Hypothesis Orientation
INTROVERT EXTRAVERT INTROVERT EXTRAVERT
Confirming evidence 24% 13% 28% 22%
Disconfirming evidence 18% 30% 21% 18%
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If the interpretation of the evidence is veridical, the subjective
connotation of recalled items will be equivalent to their "objective"
or normative implications for the hypotheses. In other words, of the
items of evidence retrieved from memory, those that are normatively
confirming, disconfirming or irrelevant will be perceived that way
despite the hypothesis. The first analysis examined the proportions
of correct interpretations made by these subjects. If no interpretive
errors were made, all (100%) of the evidence recalled would have been
interpreted correctly. This was clearly not the case. Across all
participants in both groups, less than half (46.5%) the items were
correctly interpreted.
An analysis of variance comparing the two groups and the two
hypotheses revealed that more interpretive errors were made in eval-
uating the Introvert hypothesis than in testing the Extravert
hypothesis, F(l,41)=6.68, £ < .05. When testing the former, only 37.6%
of the items were correctly interpreted, whereas 55.6% of the items
were correctly interpreted when the Extravert hypothesis was being
considered. The interaction between the number of hypotheses tested
(one or both) and the direction of the hypothesis was marginally
significant, F(l,61) = 3.61, p < .10. Subjects who tested both
hypotheses were about as correct (or as incorrect) in evaluating an
item's relevance for the Introvert hypothesis (41% correct) as they
were in assessing an item's implications for the Extravert hypothesis
(48% correct). In contrast, those who tested only the Extravert
hypothesis were correct in their interpretation of the evidence more
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often (i.e., on more items, 58%) than were those who tested only the
Introvert hypothesis (36% correct).
The fact that these subjects did not often agree with the
normative interpretation of the evidence they recalled does not in it-
self demonstrate that their appraisal of the information was biased by
the hypothesis. The next analyses examined the kind of errors made to
uncover the influence of the hypothesis. If the confirmatory error lies
in a tendency to interpret evidence in its most favorable light, i.e.,
as offering support for the hypothesis, three kinds of errors will
account for most of the discrepancy between the objective and the sub-
jective interpretations of the evidence: the tendency to view
normatively disconf irming evidence as irrelevant, or even as confirming,
and the tendency to interpret ambiguous or irrelevant information as
supportive
.
The proportions of items misinterpreted in each of these three
ways were calculated for both groups and are shown in Table 4. The
most striking feature of these data is the way disconfirming evidence
was evaluated. Those who tested the Introvert hypothesis (but not
those testing the Extravert hypothesis) interpreted many objectively
extraverted items as irrelevant to the hypothesis. The main effect
of the direction of the hypothesis was highly significant,
F = 8.65, p < .01. Even more striking is the proportion of discontinu-
ing items which came to be viewed as supportive of the hypothesis.
Averaged across both groups, those testing the Introvert hypothesis
judged some 65.1% of the extravert items to be consistent with the
Introvert hypothesis.
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TABLE 4
SUBJECTIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF RECALLED EVIDENCE
CRITICAL ORIENTATION-
BOTH HYPOTHESES
CRITICAL
SINGLE
ORIENTATION-
HYPOTHESIS
INTROVERT EXTRAVERT INTROVERT EXTRAVERT
CORRECT INTERPRETATIONS
Confirming evidence inter-
preted as confirming 80% 78% 49% 78%
Disconf irraing evidence inter-
preted as disconf irming 9% 93% 12% 85%
Irrelevant evidence inter-
preted as irrelevant 43% 32% 39% 44%
Total correct interpreta-
tions3 41% 48% 37% 58%
CONFIRMATORY MISINTERPRETATIONS
Irrelevant evidence inter-
preted as confirming 55% DJ/o 52% 51%
Disconf irming evidence inter-
preted as irrelevant 17% 0% 26% 10%
Disconfirming evidence inter-
preted as confirming 74% 7% 62% 4%
Total confirmatory misinter-
pretations 55% 45% 46% 36%
aExpressed as a percentage of the total number of items recalled.
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lence
The salience of the misinterpretation of d isconfirming evid<
may obscure the fact that this type of error accounts for relatively
little of the total amount of all confirmatory errors. While it is
true that over 60% of all extravert items recalled by those testing
the Introvert hypothesis were misjudged as supportive, most subjects
recalled few such disconfirming items (refer to Table 3). Although
misclassification of these items occurred frequently, this type of
error contributed to less than 25% of all confirmatory errors. Table
5 shows the relative contribution of each type of error to the total
amount of confirmatory errors. It can be seen that the largest single
source of error comes from the tendency to interpret irrelevant or
ambiguous evidence as favorable to the hypothesis. The data displayed
in Table 5 also show more clearly the pattern of misinterpretations
by those testing the two hypotheses. Subjects evaluating Jane's
suitability for the introvert occupation were more likely to view
negative evidence as supportive while those testing the extravert
hypothesis interpreted more ambiguous information as confirmatory.
Taken together, and across both groups and both hypotheses, some
43% of all items recalled were misinterpreted in favor of the hypo-
thesis, while only 10% were otherwise misjudged. Cast another way,
the three types of confirmatory errors account for fully 81.8% of all
the discrepancies between the objective and subjective interpretations
of the evidence available in memory.
These results demonstrate the clear influence of the hypothesis on
the interpretation of evidence. The confirmatory error may also arise
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TABLE 5
CONTRIBUTION OF EACH TYPE OF CONFIRMATORY ERROR
TO THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF CONFIRMATORY ERRORS
CRITICAL ORIENTATION-
BOTH HYPOTHESES
INTROVERT EXTRAVERT
CRITICAL ORIENTATION-
SINGLE HYPOTHESES
INTROVERT EXTRAVERT
Irrelevant evidence
interpreted as confirming 68% 98% 65% 90%
Disconf irming evidence
interpreted as confirming 26% 2% 25% 3%
Disconf irming evidence
interpreted as irrelevant 6% 0% 10% 7%
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from more subtle effects of the hypothesis on the assessment of
evidence by altering the subjective weight of items of evidence. That
is, evidence which offers only weak support may come to be viewed as
substantially confirming and evidence which argues strongly against the
hypothesis may be perceived as less damaging. This study cannot
determine the extent to which the diagnositc value of evidence was
affected by the hypothesis since there is no way to calculate the true
and unbiased weight of each item of evidence. However, since members
of the two Critical Orientation groups provided relevance ratings for
each item they recalled, it is possible to check for differences across
the two groups. This comparison was made by computing, for each member
of these two groups, the average value assigned to pro-hypothesis items
(those judged to indicate Jane's job suitability). The same average
was computed for anti-hypothesis items. There were no differences
distinguishing subjects who tested both hypotheses from those who
tested a single hypothesis on either measure. In the Both Hypotheses
group, the average weight assigned to pro-hypothesis items was 2.17,
and the average value of anti-hypothesis items was -1.11 (on the -3
to +3 scale) . Those who tested one of the two hypotheses assigned an
average value of 2.15 to items they judged as supportive of the hypo-
thesis and an average value of -1.30 to items they considered as dis-
8
confirming of the hypothesis.
CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION
The goal of this investigation was to gain a better understanding
of the way in which people answer questions about others. More specif-
ically, this study sought to determine if, and the extent to which,
the question itself may predispose its answer. By measuring both the
information retrieved from memory and the assessment of that information,
an attempt was made to work back from the final judgment to trace the
cognitive processes involved when individuals use information from
their own memory to test hypotheses about other people.
The explanation of intuitive hypothesis-testing derived from these
data is clouded by the unexpected differences between the Introvert and
Extravert hypotheses. In principle, and by design, there should have
been no differences between those who tested the Introvert hypothesis
and those who tested its alternative. Instead, significant discrepancies
occurred at each stage of the process— in the type of information re-
called, in the assessment of that evidence, and in the final judgment
of job suitability. The narrative contained equivalent amounts of
pro-introvert and pro-extravert evidence. From an objective standpoint,
the story thus supported the two hypotheses equally. And, according
to subjects who had both hypotheses before them, the narrative was
balanced: they recalled' equivalent amounts of introvert and extravert
items, they rated the pro-introvert and the pro-extravert evidence as
equivalently supportive of the two hypotheses, and, on the basis of the
narrative, they judged Jane to be equally suitable for both of the
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hypothesized occupations. Other results from the Critical
Orientation-Single Hypothesis group suggest, however, that the initial
appearance of the narrative's ambivalence may have been misleading.
Subjects in this group, the largest in the study, recalled more
introverted than extraverted items regardless of the hypothesis they
were testing. Despite the fact that the introvert items were not more
numerous, they may have been more available in memory or more salient
after the two-day interval between their acquisition and their sub-
sequent use in hypothesis- testing
.
While this makes the interpretation of the findings less straight-
forward, it does not render the data uninformative of the cognitive
processes employed enroute to a judgment about a hypothesis.
Differences in processing due to the two different orientations can
still be detected, and other generalizations from the data can be
made if the two hypotheses are considered separately.
If it can then be best assumed that the recall data of those in the
Critical Orientation-Single Hypothesis group most accurately character-
ize the distribution of introvert and extravert evidence actually
available to all subjects, it appears that the Uncritical Orientation
promotes the confirmatory error. Subjects given that orientation
(a replication of the instructions used by Snyder and Cantor) reported
as relevant more confirming than disconf irming evidence. If they
were evaluating the introvert hypothesis' they listed as relevant
more evidence confirming that hypothesis. On the other hand, if
they were evaluating Jane's suitability for the extravert occupation,
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they reported more evidence consistent with that hypothesis, even
though more of its disconf irming data were actually available. These
findings replicate the pattern found by Snyder and Cantor (1979)
using the same instructions to subjects. If anything, the data from
the present study show even more clearly the effect of the hypotheses.
Even though the narrative apparently made more introvert than extra-
vert evidence available, subjects in the Uncritical Orientation group
testing the extravert hypothesis listed as their evidence more extra-
vert than introvert items.
The difference between the Critical and Uncritical Orientations
shows the effect of different instructions or modes of gathering
evidence in hypothesis-testing. When individuals, having been given
a hypothesis, are asked only to review what they consider relevant
to that hypothesis, there is a marked tendency to focus upon more
evidence that confirms the hypothesis and less that contradicts it.
On the other hand, when individuals are asked to make a more deliberate
and thorough review of all the evidence before making any decision
about the hypothesis, the confirmatory tendency is suppressed. They
are not so influenced by the hypothesis that they recall more of its
confirming than disconfirming data.
The results obtained from the Uncritical Orientation group in this
study, as well as those found in Snyder and Cantor's experiment, are
consistent with findings obtained in related research. Wason (1960,
1968, 1969) and Wason and Johnson-Laird (1972) have shown that people
tend to test propositions by searching for instances, exemplars, or
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other evidence which would affirm their truth (i.e., "positive hits"),
while ignoring (or at least making much less effort to assemble)
evidence that would disprove them. Recall, too, that Tversky and
Kahneman's (1974) representativeness heuristic is based on the same
notion: that intuitive questions are answered by counting the amount
of supportive data. This tendency, replicated as it has been in
various judgmental tasks, seems to reflect a fundamental feature of
intuitive reasoning.
The question which prompted this present investigation was
why this tendency occurs. Does the hypothesis itself influence the
organization of information held in memory such that the confirming
evidence is made easily accessible while disconf irming data is masked
or made less retrievable? The answer on the basis of the data
gathered here is a qualified no. If the hypothesis operated as a
selective schematizing mechanism organizing only, or predominately,
its confirming instances, subjects in all groups, and especially those
in the Uncritical Orientation group, would have been expected to have
reported proportionately less disconfirming evidence. The results
show that all participants were quite able to recall substantial
amounts of disconfirming evidence.
It therefore appears that the confirmatory error is not principally
9due to the unavailability of disconf irming data. Instead, it is
traceable to the way in which the question is construed and, more
accurately, to the standard used as the basis of comparison. The data
support the view that subjects interpret Jane's job suitability to
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mean that she possesses the traits and behaviors of the prototypic
salesperson or librarian. The prototype, however, is defined
principally by traits and behaviors known or assumed to be possessed
by the majority of members of those occupations. That is, the proto-
type is defined mainly by confirming traits or behaviors. Thus, when
subjects in the Uncritical Orientation group were asked to list what
they considered relevant, they reported the traits and behaviors Jane
shared with the prototype. Since the prototype contained mostly
confirming exemplars, subjects reported more of Jane's confirming
characteristics. This confirmatory error therefore seems to have as
its source the tendency to use a comparative standard which is incomplete
and one which does not sufficiently allow the falsification of the
hypothesis
.
The review article by Einhorn and Hogarth (1978) is pertinent
here. Although they focus on the way in which antecedents and con-
sequents are learned, their discussion can be as well applied to the
way in which prototypes are developed and maintained. Einhorn and
Hogarth suggest that confirming evidence is over-represented in memory
and is used as the test of intuitive hypotheses simply because in most
situations disconf irming evidence rarely ever becomes available.
Consider, for example, how individuals in this study learn about
"suitable" real estate salespersons. Their conception comes from
successful salespeople they have known. And those already in the
profession are, for the most part, suitable (if not, they would be
asked to seek employment in other fields). The criterion against which
Jane is judged is therefore heavily weighted in terms of positive
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attributes
.
While the development of a confirmatory prototype may be a natural
and unavoidable consequence of the way real life correlations are
learned, the tendency to use that prototype as the principal standard
of comparison can be avoided. When, as those given the Critical
Orientation were, individuals are first asked to deliberately recall
all that they know about the person involved, and are then asked to
examine each bit of that evidence for its implications for the hypo-
thesis, the confirmatory error can be suppressed. These instructions
prompt individuals to be less reliant on a comparison-to-prototype
judgmental strategy. Instead of evaluating Jane against some cognitive
representation of confirming characteristics, subjects in the Critical
Orientation groups were able to attend to both the confirming and dis-
continuing attributes they had recalled from the narrative.
Additional findings from the Critical Orientation groups have
also shown how the hypothesis affects the interpretation of evidence
held in memory. All subjects in these two groups interpreted most of
the evidence recalled to be supportive of the hypothesis. Even those
who tested the extravert hypothesis and who recalled more introvert
than extravert items interpreted much more of those items as confirming
of the hypothesis. The largest source of the difference between the
amount of evidence that objectively supported the hypothesis and the
amount subjects themselves viewed as confirmatory came from the
tendency to view ambiguous or irrelevant items as favorable. Over half
of the items which normatively do not distinguish between introversion
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and extraversion came to be seen as consistent with the hypothesis.
In hindsight, it appears that the magnitude of this kind of mis-
interpretation of irrelevant evidence is overstated. Part of this
finding is due to the way in which items were defined. The classifica-
tion of evidence as introverted, extraverted, or irrelevant was taken
from a previous study by Cantor and Mischell (1977) and was also used
by Snyder and Cantor. The classification system treats as equivalently
irrelevant items which do not at all refer to Jane's personality ("Jane
drove a small car") and items which may refer to her traits but which
are not identified with introversion or extraversion ("Jane was
punctual")
.
While items in the latter category may not distinguish
between introverts and extraverts, they can provide useful information
about Jane's potential job suitability. Knowing that Jane was
punctual, for example, may not aid in determining whether she is an
introvert or an extravert, but it can be helpful in assessing her
suitability for a job. Thus, while some of the items recalled by
subjects were irrelevant to the intrcversion-extraversion dimension,
they were pertinent to a judgment about her job suitability. In this
light, it is not surprising that so many "irrelevant" items were inter-
preted as relevant by subjects in this study.
Not all of the irrelevant items were useful in testing the
hypothesis. Many were, from any point of view, quite void of
implications for Jane's occupational choice. An examination of items
of this type showed that their interpretation was influenced by the
hypothesis. To take one example, many subjects remembered that Jane
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drove a small car (Datsun) to work. A subject testing the introvert
hypothesis interpreted this as evidence that she was unflashy and
reserved, typical introverted characteristics. Another subject
considering Jane's suitability as a real estate salesperson commented
that her possession of an economical automobile would be a benefit in
that occupation since extensive driving could be expected. As another
example, subjects often recalled that Jane intended to learn about
the taxation issues involved in the coming town election. A subject
evaluating Jane's qualifications as a librarian mentioned that this
item of evidence indicated that Jane enjoyed and would be good at doing
research. A counterpart testing Jane's suitability for the alternative
job interpreted this as a positive sign of Jane's interest in land
values and taxation rates.
The finding that ambiguous or ambivalent evidence is interpreted
in light of an hypothesis is consistent with results found in other
investigations. Ajzen, Dalto and Blyth (1979) found that irrelevant
information in the form of an ambiguous personality description came
to be viewed as consistent with a pre-existing impression. The results
obtained here extend that finding to instances in which no prior
impression was formed. Here, subjects were using information they
recalled to gain an impression and they tended to interpret the
ambiguous information as supportive of the hypothesis under considera-
tion .
The results of this study, summarized briefly, suggest that
ifirmatory errors were made by all subjects, but perhaps at differentcom
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stages in the hypothesis-testing process. All those in the Uncritical
Orientation group reported as relevant more confirming than disconfirm-
ing evidence and subjects in the Critical Orientation groups tended to
interpret most of the evidence they recalled as supportive of the
hypothesis, even though, from an objective standpoint, much of that
evidence was uninformative about the hypothesis. A comparison of the
results between the two orientation groups further suggests that one
source of the confirmatory error— the tendency to assemble as evidence
mostly confirming data—can be diminished by instructions which prompt
individuals to recall all that they know about the hypothesized person
and to carefully examine that evidence for its implications for the
hypothesis
.
This demonstration of unintentional flaws in intuitive judgmental
processes is in keeping with virtually all of the contemporary research
on the way in which people come to understand others and the world
about them. With the possible exception of Ajzen (1977), all of the
published investigations of human reasoning reviewed in Chapters One
and Two or cited elsewhere in this paper have shown individuals to be
in error in the way they make inferences or judgments. The impression
created by this body of literature is that the intuitive scientist is
all shortcomings and no strengths. It is hard to imagine that any
individual who commits the kind of flaws noted in the literature as
frequently as he or she is said to commit them would go through a
single day without causing serious harm to him/herself or others.
It is even harder to imagine that a species comprised of such error-
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prone individuals would survive. Since the species and most individuals
seem to be doing at least passably well, the impression created by the
literature must be misleading. The research, including the present
study, has either succeeded in illuminating only trivial judgmental
errors, or its methods and procedures have promoted flawed judgments
to a degree that is atypical of ordinary circumstances. This study may
be guilty of both. The methodological artifacts which overstate the
magnitude of the confirmatory error have been described above. But
the importance of the confirmatory error itself also deserves closer
scrutiny. In this study, as in Snyder and Cantor's original experiment,
subjects made confirmatory errors in gathering evidence about Jane.
But neither in this study nor in Snyder and Cantor's were they mislead
by those errors to enthusiastically endorse Jane's job suitability.
In this study the average estimate of Jane's suitability for the real
estate job was just above the mid-point (X = 3.52) and the subjects'
assessment of her qualifications for the introverted occupation was at
the mid-point (X = 2.56). Similarly, Snyder and Cantor did not find
their subjects to be very impressed with Jane's job potential even
though they used as evidence more confirming than disconfirming data.
On a one-to-six scale, the average job suitability judgments were about
mid-way between ill-suited and well-suited (X = 3.86 for the introvert
job and 3.88 for its alternative). The paradox that emerges then is
that processes antecedent to a final judgment are shown to be flawed,
but the final judgment itself is in line with the normatively correct
expectations. Perhaps a new line of research should be devoted
to
resolving this kind of paradox to illuminate how people
succeed so
well in their intuitive reasoning while at the same time making
what appear to be pervasive errors in that reasoning process.
Footnotes
1
In most of the studies of subjective judgment, subjects are asked
to estimate the likelihood or probability of any outcome or multiple
outcomes. Probabilistic dependent measures are used because they
allow the comparison of intuitive inferences against those prescribed
by probability or statistical theory. However, adherence to the dictates
of statistical principles has subtly become the standard of "rationality"
in decision making. It is not the best measure of the soundness of all
judgments
.
In statistics courses students estimate the probability of drawing
a red marble from an urn. When they come to social psychology experi-
ments they may be asked to estimate the likelihood that any individual,
or the individual described in a brief character sketch, is an engineer
or a lawyer. If they ever serve on a jury they are asked to decide if
the evidence points, beyond a reasonable doubt, to the defendant's
guilt. In all these instances, the judgment is one of probability.
However, these examples seem to imply different meanings of the term.
In one sense, and the one implied in judgments of the likelihood
of drawing a marble of a certain color from an urn, or of the
likelihood that any unspecified individual is an engineer, probability
refers to statistical regularity. In this sense, the probability of
an event is an expression of the relative frequency with which similar
events occur in the long run (cf. von Mises, 1951). Probability here
refers to a collective of events, not to a particular member of that
collective. To say that the probability of heads on the next toss is
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one half is to express some expectation about the set of coin tosses
in an unlimited sequence of tosses, each of which is independent. It
says nothing about one particular coin toss. Statistical probabilities
rest upon certain assumptions (independence and randomness) and are
calculated and combined according to specified arithmetic manipulations.
There is, however, another meaning of probability, one which refers
to individual events rather than to long run sequences of similar
events. It can be argued, furthermore, that most judgmental tasks,
whether posed in an experiment or suggested by everyday experience,
involve this alternative connotation of probability. When subjects are
asked whether Jack is a lawyer or an engineer they are not asked about
a collective of people like Jack, they are asked to make a decision
about one particular person.
The counter-argument is that this other meaning of probability is
not in any fundamental way a different kind of judgment. This position
would hold that probabilities of specific events can and should be
regarded within the statistical framework. This contention is
implicit in the research on intuitive reasoning. By comparing the
probability of single events to that prescribed by statistical models,
researchers imply that idiographic probabilities should conform to
those describing nomothetic expectations.
This argument seems to have little support outside the social
sciences. Von Mises (1951), for one, admits that the probability
of single particular events is not a subject for the probability
ilculus. Speaking for the community of classic probabilityca^
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statisticians, he writes, "The probability of death, when it refers to
a single person, has no meaning for us" (p. 11). Various other authors
seem to agree and incommensurate connotation of "probability." For
Kneale (1949), probability meant justifiability. In his interpretation,
to say that a conclusion or hypothesis was probable was to say that
the evidence justifies ("probabilif ies") the conclusion. Popper
(1959) also takes probability to mean evidential support. Similarly,
Carnap (1950) discusses probability in terms of degrees of confirma-
tion of conclusions by information. Cohen (1977) describes it as a
gradation of inferential support. Despite differences in synonyms,
probability is, for all these writers, clearly relative to case-specific
judgments and clearly different from expectations about collectives of
similar events. Rather than expressing an expectation about relative
frequencies in the long run, probability refers to an expectation
about a particular event at a particular time. Historical regularities
in sequences of events may be included as part of the evidence upon
which a probabilistic (in this alternative sense of the word) estimate
is made, but they are not the only or the best sources of evidence.
For some, even intuition was regarded as valid evidential support
(Carnap, 1950; Keynes, 1921).
There seems to be substantial agreement that the classic or
mathematicist interpretation of probability is insufficient to account
for the meaning implied by its usage in many cases. There is,
however, far less agreement about the defining features of
the
alternative interpretation. Kneale (1949) argued that his
concept
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of probabilif ication was not even a quantifiable concept and could not
in any meaningful way be incorporated into any formal calculus. It
could be ordered in terms of the degree to which the evidence supported
the hypothesis, such that it is possible to distinguish instances
in which the conclusion is strongly supported from those in which it is
barely probabilif ied. But there are also instances in which it is
difficult to determine whether or not, or to what degree, a hypothesis
is supported. For Kneale, probability was a logical, not a metrical,
concept. Keynes (1921) also embraced the notion of probability as a
logical relation between evidence and a conclusion, but argued that
probabilistic relations could be represented in a formal mathematical
theory. However, in the theory he proposed, probabilities of different
events were not comparable in magnitude. So it was not possible to say
that the probability of one hypothesis based on some evidence was
greater or less than the probability of another hypothesis based on
different evidence. Popper's probability-as-corroboration does not
obey the formal calculus of classic probability. Carnap takes the
term
to mean the measure of one's rational degree of belief in a
conclusion
or hypothesis. That degree of belief could be calculated
as a precise
value between zero and one. If held by rational people,
degrees of
belief were said to obey certain function-rules ("credence
functions")
describing the relationship between evidence and the
hypothesis. While
Carnap 's is then a quantitative theory, it is not
the same as the
statistical theory of probability (if it were, there
would have been
little need for him to spend his life making up
a new one). Carnap has,
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nonetheless, failed to convince his critics that the logical concept
of probability can, like the classic concept, be mapped onto a formal
calculus and calculated as a precise value. Strawson (1952) argued
explicitly against a formal and quantitative expression of logical
probability: "We can never describe the strength of evidence more
exactly than by the use of such words as 'slender', 'good',
'conclusive'.
.
." (p. 247). Similarly, Cohen's "inductive probability"
is "rough, indeterminate, and a matter for judgment" (p. 40). Instead
of being precisely quantifiable, it allows only comparative or
ordinal gradations.
The point of this note is not to offer a resolution to the long-
standing difference of opinion about the quantif iability of logical
probability. The purpose is to draw attention to the subjective
interpretation of probabilistic dependent measures. This discussion
should suggest that probability, when it refers to picking a marble
out of an urn, may not mean the same thing, nor should it be calculated
in the same manner, as the probability that Jack is an engineer. In
many cases, an individual's estimate of probability represents his or
her belief in the (psycho) logical inferability of the hypothesis,
given the evidence. It does not refer to their computations of empir-
ical frequencies according to a formal calculus.
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D is the cause of C if it is not a spurious cause, i.e., if no
event antecedent to D accounts for the conditional probability of the
effect just as completely. D is a spurious cause of C if there exists
a prior event A such that:
p { C / D & A } = p{ C / A}
See Chapter 8 of Wason and Johnson-Laird for a discussion of some
differences between logical material implication and psychological
implication
.
A
The distinction here between errors and biases is somewhat differ-
ent from that of Kruglanski and Aj zen . Here, errors are cognitive in
origin and biases are motivational.
I would like to thank Dr. Mark Snyder for making his stimulus
materials available to me.
6
Snyder and Cantor (1979) had the independent judges divide the
recalled evidence into only two categories— introvert and extravert.
Since the narrative used in this study was modified to include neutral
or irrelevant descriptors, the independent judges included the
irrelevant category as one of the classifications. Ambivalent items
are those listed by subjects which make reference to both introvert
and extravert characteristics (e.g., "Jane was outgoing when jogging
but shy at the office")
.
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Analyses involving the subjects who tested both hypotheses were
conducted by following the procedure outlined by Erlebacher (1977).
In that paper Erlebacher describes a technique for deriving the
appropriate sums of squares, mean squares, degrees of freedom, and
quasi-F ratios for an analysis of variance that includes the design
type as a factor in the analysis. Design type refers to the distinction
between a Within-subject and a Between-subject manipulation.
Erlebacher' s procedure is well-suited for this design in which the
subjects who tested one of the two alternative hypotheses (Between-
subject manipulation) were measured against those who tested both of
the hypotheses (Within-subject manipulation). I would like to thank
Dr. Jerry Myers for recommending Erlebacher' s article and for patiently
explaining the generalization of that procedure to multi-factor designs.
g
The effect of a hypothesis on the type of information recalled
from memory and on the interpretation of that information may be
strongest on the initial items of evidence recalled. This assumption
is based on the view that the first items may be more spontaneously
retrieved while latter items may be the product of a more deliberate
memory search and their retrieval may therefore be less dependent
upon the influence of the hypothesis. To examine this possibility,
separate analyses of each of the dependent measures described here
were conducted comparing the first five items recalled against all
other items. No differences were found on any measure.
This is not to deny that cognitive sets induced prior to the
acquisition of knowledge do not operate as organizing schemas for
subsequent information stored in memory. A considerable amount of
recent research has shown that pre-existing trait dimensions (Cantor
& Mischell, 1977), self concepts (Markus, 1977), and attitudes (Judd
& Kulik, 1980) can direct the way in which relevant knowledge is
organized in memory. The "induced set" research essentially deals
with the influence of prior expectations or wishes on processes used
to encode later information. In contrast, the present study deals
with the effect of a hypothesis on previously encoded information.
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Appendix A
Instructions and Narrative
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Instructions
In this study we are interested in people's ability to remember
the factual details of a story that describes a week in the life of
another person. There has recently been a great deal of concern with
people's ability to notice factual details and to remember these
details when they observe or hear about real-life events. Although
people seem to be quite good at recalling the gist of a story, there
is less support for their ability to remember the factual details of
one. The ability to remember factual details can be quite important
in certain aspects of our lives. For instance, eyewitness testimony
in a court trial depends on the ability to remember often small
details of a visual scene or another person's physical appearance.
In our study you will read a story about a week in the life of an
actual person—Jane. The names and places have been changed in order
to conceal this person's real identity. We would like you to simply
read the story and concentrate as you read on the factual details
about people, places, and events in the story. Consider that you are
reading a story in order to be able to tell someone else about the
details contained in that story. After you read the story, we will
ask you to tell us about some of the details from the story.
You will have 7 minutes to read the story. It is 4 pages long
so you should have plenty of time to read it through at a comfortable
pace
.
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At 7:15 on Monday morning Jane woke up, turned off the alarm
clock, and crawled out of bed. She dressed quickly in a tweed skirt
and red blouse, ate her usual cornflakes breakfast, and got ready to
leave. This morning Jane had a doctor's appointment before work. The
mist had gathered on her new Datsun and she stopped just long enough
to clean the windshield before starting off. Jane was cautious and
drove slowly in the downtown traffic. She pulled up to the large
Jackson building on Hyde Street in time to find a parking spot. In
the elevator on the way up to the doctor's office, Jane kept aloof
from the other passengers and didn't join in the joking about how
the elevators in these old buildings take forever. She got off, along
with six other people, at the 5th floor.
Jane greeted the doctor's nurse with a smile. While waiting for
the doctor she had a conversation with another patient about running
and other sports. Finally, the doctor was able to see her. Jane
had a quick check-up, consisting of a blood sample, an eye test, and
an EKG. She seemed to be in perfect health and left quickly after the
check-up. Doctor's offices always seemed to run behind schedule.
Jane arrived at work a little late since her appointment took
longer than she expected. Nevertheless, Jane was both efficient and
productive and managed to get several important tasks done before the
morning coffee break. The people in Jane's office took their 20
minute coffee break together and spent most of the time talking about
their weekends. Jane didn't seem to want to take part in this social
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activity. She remained reserved and discrete about her personal life.
When one of the men asked her for a date, Jane looked to the ground
and seemed to be self-conscious. Everyone around the office was
talking about the high price of coffee. It was much too expensive
and everyone was trying to find an alternative drink. Tea seemed
almost as expensive and didn't quite take the place of a good cup of
coffee. After a brief discussion, everyone went back to work.
The rest of the day was fairly hectic—as most Mondays tend to
be. Jane's job often required close cooperation with other people,
which meant that she had to be patient and courteous, but at the same
time, deliberate and effective. Jane was known as a very able worker
who had the right blend of interpersonal skills and task dedication.
After work, Jane got ready to do her hour's worth of running for
the day. She started down Humboldt street near her house, turned
right at James Street, and then ran through the whole Brentwood
district. Most of the streets around her house were beautifully lined
with trees and had relatively traffic-free paths for running. Jane
would run vigorously for at least an hour a day. She kept a busy
schedule, going from activity to activity, and gave the impression
of having unlimited energy. Somehow she managed to remain friendly
and outgoing despite her long day at work. Jane loved to run and
seemed enthusiastic and. cheerful even when the weather wasn't exactly
ideal. Today she was running with a neighbor named Mary Stuart and
the two of them spend the entire time in spirited talk—cracking
jokes and boasting about their running skills and endurance. During
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her run, Jane came across people she didn't know but said hello to
each of them anyhow. Sometimes she was uncomfortable with strangers,
but not today. She surprised herself in how forcefully she exercised
after such a long day at work. Sports had lately become a fad in her
neighborhood and it was amazing to see the streets lined with joggers
at the end of the day. The sportswear industry was certainly doing a
booming business—everybody had on their new pair of Adidas and their
fancy new sweatpants. Jane was saving up to buy a new pair of running
shoes. She had always been pretty thrifty and had little trouble
saving for something she really wanted.
Two days later, Jane went to the local Safeway supermarket to do
her weekly shopping. She walked down the aisles, amazed at the high
price of food. Even the price of soap had gone up in the last week.
As a rule, Jane tried to remain unnoticed at the market and avoided
interaction with other shoppers from her neighborhood. She was timid
and shy, buying her food and waiting patiently in line. Today, Ethel,
the checkout clerk, tried to engage Jane in conversation, but Jane
remained bashful and hesitant. The big supermarkets were certainly a
lot different than the typical local stores Jane remembered from just
five years ago. They now had complicated labelling and computerized
check-out systems. As far as Jane was concerned, the move to modern
supermarkets was a step backwards. Not only did one have to pay
outrageous prices for the food these days, but also had to put up
with the noise and crowds.
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Jane took classes at Redding College three nights a week. The
adult education program in the area was superbly run. One of her
classes was Communications and the students were practicing debating
skills. This was particularly appropriate for Jane since she was
about to run for a position in the local government and would be
exchanging views with several other candidates. Jane was always
tolerant of other people's views, and treated everyone with courtesy,
but she was also serious about her own point of view. The local
politicians considered that Jane had a good chance of winning in her
campaign. She was ambitious and seemed to be confident in her opinions.
They also recognized, however, that she was new to politics and hadn't
developed many of the more practical skills. She tended, for example,
to be a little too soft-spoken. It was never really clear how these
local races would turn out. The public got fairly involved in local
politics and were genuinely interested in the issues. As in most areas
of the country, the current problem was how to get enough money for
local programs without taxing the citizens beyond their ability to
pay. The taxes in this area had gone up 15% in the last two years.
Jane didn't know a great deal about taxation and municipal finances,
but she had reasonably good mathematical skills and figured she could
learn about the issues quickly.
Jane's college course schedule was heavy this semester— three
night classes. She was generally quite anxious over her work. In
most of her classes she felt somewhat inhibited and tried to think
through a question before she dared ask it. Professor Osborne assigned
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a lot of reading in her Literature class, but Jane did not mind
spending hours alone in the library. It had recently been remodeled
and the booths for studying were comfortable and quiet. The only
problem was that the booths in the back part of most rooms were too
warm. Jane had meant to complain to the staff about this, but never
got around to actually making the complaint.
That weekend, Jane went to McAllister park and sat and daydreamed
for hours. Although the park was full of people, Jane appeared deep
in thought and withdrawn from the activity around her. She felt a
little sad and spent most of the day by herself. Later that evening
she went to a pot-luck party at a neighbor's house. Jane had cooked
enough chili to feed practically the whole neighborhood. Since every-
one brought something different to eat, the dinner was a lot of fun.
After dinner they put on some records and Jane danced for much of the
rest of the evening. The party went on for quite a while and late that
night they all pitched in to help clean up. It was certainly an
improvement in the spirit of the neighborhood and everyone discussed
what a difference these get-togethers had made in the atmosphere on
the block. The only way to make a city liveable was to keep the
neighborhoods beautiful and the people in close contact.
The next morning the alarm clock went off as usual at 7:15. Jane
turned over in a groggy state of half-sleep, realized it was Sunday,
and cursed the alarm clock. She curled up to try to recover that
pleasant state of drowsy unconsciousness, but she was no better than
most people at falling back to sleep, so she got out of bed and went
to make a pot of coffee.
Appendix B
Test of Factual Knowledge
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What kind of car did Jane own?
What street was the Jackson Building on?
On what floor was the doctor's office?
How long was the coffee break where Jane worked?
What was Jane saving her money for?
What supermarket did Jane shop at?
What was the name of the college Jane attended?
How many courses did she take during the semester?
What was the percent increase in local taxes?
What was the name of Jane's neighborhood?

